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more or less vehement and enthusiastic； but what are the
CONCEPTIONS of God and divine things by which these emotions are
called forth。 Feeling is necessary in religion； but it is by the
CONTENT or intelligent basis of a religion； and not by feeling；
that its character and worth are to be determined。〃＇290＇
＇289＇ Op。 cit。； p。 174； abridged。
＇290＇ Ibid。； p。 186； abridged and italicized。
Cardinal Newman； in his work； The Idea of a University； gives
more emphatic expression still to this disdain for
sentiment。＇291＇ Theology； he says； is a science in the strictest
sense of the word。 I will tell you； he says； what it is not
not 〃physical evidences〃 for God； not 〃natural religion；〃 for
these are but vague subjective interpretations：
＇291＇ Discourse II。 Section 7。
〃If；〃 he continues； 〃the Supreme Being is powerful or skillful；
just so far as the telescope shows power； or the microscope shows
skill； if his moral law is to be ascertained simply by the
physical processes of the animal frame； or his will gathered from
the immediate issues of human affairs； if his Essence is just as
high and deep and broad as the universe and no more if this be
the fact； then will I confess that there is no specific science
about God； that theology is but a name； and a protest in its
behalf an hypocrisy。 Then； pious as it is to think of Him while
the pageant of experiment or abstract reasoning passes by； still
such piety is nothing more than a poetry of thought； or an
ornament of language； a certain view taken of Nature which one
man has and another has not； which gifted minds strike out； which
others see to be admirable and ingenious； and which all would be
the better for adopting。 It is but the theology of Nature； just
as we talk of the PHILOSOPHY or the ROMANCE of history； or the
POETRY of childhood； or the picturesque or the sentimental or the
humorous； or any other abstract quality which the genius or the
caprice of the individual； or the fashion of the day； or the
consent of the world； recognizes in any set of objects which are
subjected to its contemplation。 I do not see much difference
between avowing that there is no God； and implying that nothing
definite can be known for certain about Him。〃
What I mean by Theology； continues Newman； is none of these
things： 〃I simply mean the SCIENCE OF GOD； or the truths we know
about God； put into a system； just as we have a science of the
stars and call it astronomy； or of the crust of the earth and
call it geology。〃
In both these extracts we have the issue clearly set before us：
Feeling valid only for the individual is pitted against reason
valid universally。 The test is a perfectly plain one of fact。
Theology based on pure reason must in point of fact convince men
universally。 If it did not； wherein would its superiority
consist？ If it only formed sects and schools； even as sentiment
and mysticism form them； how would it fulfill its programme of
freeing us from personal caprice and waywardness？ This perfectly
definite practical test of the pretensions of philosophy to found
religion on universal reason simplifies my procedure to…day。 I
need not discredit philosophy by laborious criticism of its
arguments。 It will suffice if I show that as a matter of history
it fails to prove its pretension to be 〃objectively〃 convincing。
In fact； philosophy does so fail。 It does not banish
differences； it founds schools and sects just as feeling does。 I
believe； in fact； that the logical reason of man operates in this
field of divinity exactly as it has always operated in love； or
in patriotism； or in politics； or in any other of the wider
affairs of life； in which our passions or our mystical intuitions
fix our beliefs beforehand。 It finds arguments for our
conviction； for indeed it HAS to find them。 It amplifies and
defines our faith； and dignifies it and lends it words and
plausibility。 It hardly ever engenders it； it cannot now secure
it。＇292＇
＇292＇ As regards the secondary character of intellectual
constructions； and the primacy of feeling and instinct in
founding religious beliefs see the striking work of H。 Fielding；
The Hearts of Men； London； 1902； which came into my hands after
my text was written。 〃Creeds；〃 says the author； 〃are the grammar
of religion； they are to religion what grammar is to speech。
Words are the expression of our wants grammar is the theory
formed afterwards。 Speech never proceeded from grammar； but the
reverse。 As speech progresses and changes from unknown causes；
grammar must follow〃 （p。 313）。 The whole book； which keeps
unusually close to concrete facts； is little more than an
amplification of this text。
Lend me your attention while I run through some of the points of
the older systematic theology。 You find them in both Protestant
and Catholic manuals； best of all in the innumerable text…books
published since Pope Leo's Encyclical recommending the study of
Saint Thomas。 I glance first at the arguments by which dogmatic
theology establishes God's existence； after that at those by
which it establishes his nature。＇293＇
＇293＇ For convenience' sake； I follow the order of A。 Stockl's
Lehrbuch der Philosophie； 5te Autlage； Mainz； 1881； Band ii。 B。
Boedder's Natural Theology； London； 1891； is a handy English
Catholic Manual； but an almost identical doctrine is given by
such Protestant theologians as C。 Hodge： Systematic Theology；
New York； 1873； or A。 H。 Strong： Systematic Theology； 5th
edition； New York； 1896。
The arguments for God's existence have stood for hundreds of
years with the waves of unbelieving criticism breaking against
them； never totally discrediting them in the ears of the
faithful； but on the whole slowly and surely washing out the
mortar from between their joints。 If you have a God already whom
you believe in； these arguments confirm you。 If you are
atheistic； they fail to set you right。 The proofs are various。
The 〃cosmological〃 one； so…called； reasons from the contingence
of the world to a First Cause which must contain whatever
perfections the world itself contains。 The 〃argument
from design〃 reasons； from the fact that Nature's laws are
mathematical； and her parts benevolently adapted to each other；
that this cause is both intellectual and benevolent。 The 〃moral
argument〃 is that the moral law presupposes a lawgiver。 The
〃argument ex consensu gentium〃 is that the belief in God is so
widespread as to be grounded in the rational nature of man； and
should therefore carry authority with it。
As I just said； I will not discuss these arguments technically。
The bare fact that all idealists since Kant have felt entitled
either to scout or to neglect them shows that they are not solid
enough to serve as religion's all…sufficient foundation。
Absolutely impersonal reasons would be in duty bound to show more
general convincingness。 Causation is indeed too obscure a
principle to bear the weight of the whole structure of theology。
As for the argument from design； see how Darwinian ideas have
revolutionized it。 Conceived as we now conceive them； as so many
fortunate escapes from almost limitless processes of destruction；
the benevolent adaptations which we find in Nature suggest a
deity very different from the one who figured in the earlier
versions of the argument。＇294＇ The fact is that these arguments
do but follow the combined suggestions of the facts and of our
feeling。 They prove nothing rigorously。 They only corroborate
our preexistent partialities。
＇294＇ It must not be forgotten that any form of DISorder in the
world might； by the design argument； suggest a God for just that
kind of disorder。 The truth is that any state of things whatever
that can be named is logically susceptible of teleological
interpretation。 The ruins of the earthquake at Lisbon； for
example： the whole of past history had to be planned exactly as
it was to bring about in the fullness of time just that
particular arrangement of debris of masonry； furniture； and once
living bodies。 No other train of causes would have been
sufficient。 And so of any other arrangement； bad or good； which
might as a matter of fact be found resulting anywhere from
previous conditions。 To avoid such p