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＇300＇ A。 C。 Fraser： Philosophy of Theism； second edition；
Edinburgh and London； 1899； especially part ii； chaps。 vii。 and
viii。 A。 Seth ＇Pringle…Pattison＇： Hegelianism and Personality；
Ibid。； 1890； passim。
The most persuasive arguments in favor of a concrete individual
Soul of the world； with which I am acquainted； are those of my
colleague； Josiah Royce； in his Religious Aspect of Philosophy；
Boston； 1885； in his Conception of God； New York and London；
1897； and lately in his Aberdeen Gifford Lectures； The World and
the Individual； 2 vols。； New York and London； 1901…02。 I
doubtless seem to some of my readers to evade the philosophic
duty which my thesis in this lecture imposes on me； by not even
attempting to meet Professor Royce's arguments articulately。 I
admit the momentary evasion。 In the present lectures； which are
cast throughout in a popular mould； there seemed no room for
subtle metaphysical discussion； and for tactical purposes it was
sufficient the contention of philosophy being what it is （namely；
that religion can be transformed into a universally convincing
science）； to point to the fact that no religious philosophy has
actually convinced the mass of thinkers。 Meanwhile let me say
that I hope that the present volume may be followed by another；
if I am spared to write it； in which not only Professor Royce's
arguments； but others for monistic absolutism shall be considered
with all the technical fullness which their great importance
calls for。 At present I resign myself to lying passive under the
reproach of superficiality。
What religion reports； you must remember； always purports to be a
fact of experience： the divine is actually present； religion
says； and between it and ourselves relations of give and take are
actual。 If definite perceptions of fact like this cannot stand
upon their own feet； surely abstract reasoning cannot give them
the support they are in need of。 Conceptual processes can class
facts； define them； interpret them； but they do not produce them；
nor can they reproduce their individuality。 There is always a
PLUS； a THISNESS； which feeling alone can answer for。 Philosophy
in this sphere is thus a secondary function； unable to warrant
faith's veracity； and so I revert to the thesis which I announced
at the beginning of this lecture。
In all sad sincerity I think we must conclude that the attempt to
demonstrate by purely intellectual processes the truth of the
deliverances of direct religious experience is absolutely
hopeless。
It would be unfair to philosophy； however； to leave her under
this negative sentence。 Let me close； then； by briefly
enumerating what she CAN do for religion。 If she will abandon
metaphysics and deduction for criticism and induction； and
frankly transform herself from theology into science of
religions； she can make herself enormously useful。
The spontaneous intellect of man always defines the divine which
it feels in ways that harmonize with its temporary intellectual
prepossessions。 Philosophy can by comparison eliminate the local
and the accidental from these definitions。 Both from dogma and
from worship she can remove historic incrustations。 By
confronting the spontaneous religious constructions with the
results of natural science； philosophy can also eliminate
doctrines that are now known to be scientifically absurd or
incongruous。
Sifting out in this way unworthy formulations； she can leave a
residuum of conceptions that at least are possible。 With these
she can deal as HYPOTHESES； testing them in all the manners；
whether negative or positive； by which hypotheses are ever
tested。 She can reduce their number； as some are found more open
to objection。 She can perhaps become the champion of one which
she picks out as being the most closely verified or verifiable。
She can refine upon the definition of this hypothesis；
distinguishing between what is innocent over…belief and symbolism
in the expression of it； and what is to be literally taken。 As a
result； she can offer mediation between different believers； and
help to bring about consensus of opinion。 She can do this the
more successfully； the better she discriminates the common and
essential from the individual and local elements of the religious
beliefs which she compares。
I do not see why a critical Science of Religions of this sort
might not eventually command as general a public adhesion as is
commanded by a physical science。 Even the personally
non…religious might accept its conclusions on trust； much as
blind persons now accept the facts of opticsit might appear as
foolish to refuse them。 Yet as the science of optics has to be
fed in the first instance； and continually verified later； by
facts experienced by seeing persons； so the science of religions
would depend for its original material on facts of personal
experience； and would have to square itself with personal
experience through all its critical reconstructions。 It could
never get away from concrete life； or work in a conceptual
vacuum。 It would forever have to confess； as every science
confesses； that the subtlety of nature flies beyond it； and that
its formulas are but approximations。 Philosophy lives in words；
but truth and fact well up into our lives in ways that exceed
verbal formulation。 There is in the living act of perception
always something that glimmers and twinkles and will not be
caught； and for which reflection comes too late。 No one knows
this as well as the philosopher。 He must fire his volley of new
vocables out of his conceptual shotgun； for his profession
condemns him to this industry； but he secretly knows the
hollowness and irrelevancy。 His formulas are like stereoscopic or
kinetoscopic photographs seen outside the instrument； they lack
the depth； the motion； the vitality。 In the religious sphere； in
particular； belief that formulas are true can never wholly take
the place of personal experience。
In my next lecture I will try to complete my rough description of
religious experience； and in the lecture after that； which is the
last one； I will try my hand at formulating conceptually the
truth to which it is a witness。