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by Nicolo Machiavelli
Written c。 1505； published 1515
translated by W。 K。 Marriott
CHAPTER I
HOW MANY KINDS OF PRINCIPALITIES THERE ARE； AND BY WHAT MEANS THEY ARE
ACQUIRED
ALL STATES； all powers； that have held and hold rule over men have been
and are either republics or principalities。
Principalities are either hereditary； in which the family has been long
established； or they are new。
The new are either entirely new； as was Milan to Francesco Sforza； or
they are； as it were； members annexed to the hereditary state of the
prince who has acquired them； as was the kingdom of Naples to that of
the King of Spain。
Such dominions thus acquired are either accustomed to live under a
prince； or to live in freedom； and are acquired either by the arms of
the prince himself； or of others； or else by fortune or by ability。
CHAPTER II
CONCERNING HEREDITARY PRINCIPALITIES
I WILL leave out all discussion on republics； inasmuch as in another
place I have written of them at length； ＇1＇ and will address myself only
to principalities。 In doing so I will keep to the order indicated above；
and discuss how such principalities are to be ruled and preserved。
I say at once there are fewer difficulties in holding hereditary states；
and those long accustomed to the family of their prince； than new ones；
for it is sufficient only not to transgress the customs of his
ancestors； and to deal prudently with circumstances as they arise； for a
prince of average powers to maintain himself in his state； unless he be
deprived of it by some extraordinary and excessive force； and if he
should be so deprived of it； whenever anything sinister happens to the
usurper； he will regain it。
We have in Italy； for example； the Duke of Ferrara； who could not have
withstood the attacks of the Venetians in '84； nor those of Pope Julius
in '10； unless he had been long established in his dominions。 For the
hereditary prince has less cause and less necessity to offend； hence it
happens that he will be more loved； and unless extraordinary vices cause
him to be hated； it is reasonable to expect that his subjects will be
naturally well disposed towards him； and in the antiquity and duration
of his rule the memories and motives that make for change are lost； for
one change always leaves the toothing for another。
1。 Discourses。
CHAPTER III
CONCERNING MIXED PRINCIPALITIES
BUT the difficulties occur in a new principality。 And firstly； if it be
not entirely new； but is； as it were； a member of a state which； taken
collectively； may be called posite； the changes arise chiefly from an
inherent difficulty which there is in all new principalities； for men
change their rulers willingly； hoping to better themselves； and this
hope induces them to take up arms against him who rules： wherein they
are deceived； because they afterwards find by experience they have gone
from bad to worse。 This follows also on another natural and mon
necessity； which always causes a new prince to burden those who have
submitted to him with his soldiery and with infinite other hardships
which he must put upon his new acquisition。
In this way you have enemies in all those whom you have injured in
seizing that principality； and you are not able to keep those friends
who put you there because of your not being able to satisfy them in the
way they expected； and you cannot take strong measures against them；
feeling bound to them。 For； although one may be very strong in armed
forces； yet in entering a province one has always need of the goodwill
of the natives。
For these reasons Louis XII； King of France； quickly occupied Milan； and
as quickly lost it； and to turn him out the first time it only needed
Lodovico's own forces； because those who had opened the gates to him；
finding themselves deceived in their hopes of future benefit； would not
endure the ill…treatment of the new prince。 It is very true that； after
acquiring rebellious provinces a second time； they are not so lightly
lost afterwards； because the prince； with little reluctance； takes the
opportunity of the rebellion to punish the delinquents； to clear out the
suspects； and to strengthen himself in the weakest places。 Thus to cause
France to lose Milan the first time it was enough for the Duke Lodovico
to raise insurrections on the borders； but to cause him to lose it a
second time it was necessary to bring the whole world against him； and
that his armies should be defeated and driven out of Italy； which
followed from the causes above mentioned。
Nevertheless Milan was taken from France both the first and the second
time。 The general reasons for the first have been discussed； it remains
to name those for the second； and to see what resources he had； and what
any one in his situation would have had for maintaining himself more
securely in his acquisition than did the King of France。
Now I say that those dominions which； when acquired； are added to an
ancient state by him who acquires them； are either of the same country
and language； or they are not。 When they are； it is easier to hold them；
especially when they have not been accustomed to self…government； and to
hold them securely it is enough to have destroyed the family of the
prince who was ruling them； because the two peoples； preserving in other
things the old conditions； and not being unlike in customs； will live
quietly together； as one has seen in Brittany； Burgundy； Gascony； and
Normandy； which have been bound to France for so long a time： and；
although there may be some difference in language； nevertheless the
customs are alike； and the people will easily be able to get on amongst
themselves。 He who has annexed them； if he wishes to hold them； has only
to bear in mind two considerations： the one； that the family of their
former lord is extinguished； the other； that neither their laws nor
their taxes are altered； so that in a very short time they will bee
entirely one body with the old principality。
But when states are acquired in a country differing in language；
customs； or laws； there are difficulties； and good fortune and great
energy are needed to hold them； and one of the greatest and most real
helps would be that he who has acquired them should go and reside there。
This would make his position more secure and durable； as it has made
that of the Turk in Greece； who； notwithstanding all the other measures
taken by him for holding that state； if he had not settled there； would
not have been able to keep it。 Because； if one is on the spot； disorders
are seen as they spring up； and one can quickly remedy them； but if one
is not at hand； they heard of only when they are one can no longer
remedy them。 Besides this； the country is not pillaged by your
officials； the subjects are satisfied by prompt recourse to the prince；
thus； wishing to be good； they have more cause to love him； and wishing
to be otherwise； to fear him。 He who would attack that state from the
outside must have the utmost caution； as long as the prince resides
there it can only be wrested from him with the greatest difficulty。
The other and better course is to send colonies to one or two places；
which may be as keys to that state； for it necessary either to do this
or else to keep there a great number of cavalry and infantry。 A prince
does not spend much on colonies； for with little or no expense he can
send them out and keep them there； and he offends a minority only of the
citizens from whom he takes lands and houses to give them to the new
inhabitants； and those whom he offends； remaining poor and scattered；
are never able to injure him； whilst the rest being uninjured are easily
kept quiet； and at the same time are anxious not to err for fear it
should happen to them as it has to those who have been despoiled。 In
conclusion； I say that these colonies are not costly； they are more
faithful； they injure less； and the injured； as has been said； being
poor and scattered； cannot hurt。 Upon this； one has to remark that men
ought either to be well treated or crushed； because they can avenge
themselves of lighter injuries； of more serious ones they cannot；
therefore the injury that is to be done to a man ought to be of such a
kind that one does not stand in fear of revenge。
But in maintaining armed men there in place of colonies one spends much
more； having to consume on the garrison all ine from the state； so
that the acquisition turns into a loss； and many more are exasperated；
because the whole state is injured； through the shifting of the garrison
up and down all bee acquainted with hardship； and all bee hostile；
and they are enemies who； whilst beaten on their own ground； are yet
able to do hurt。 For every reason； therefore； such guards are as useless
as a colony is useful。
Again； the prince who holds a country differing in the above respects