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and he who is highly esteemed is not easily conspired against； for；
provided it is well known that he is an excellent man and revered by his
people； he can only be attacked with difficulty。 For this reason a
prince ought to have two fears； one from within； on account of his
subjects； the other from without； on account of external powers。 From
the latter he is defended by being well armed and having good allies；
and if he is well armed he will have good friends； and affairs will
always remain quiet within when they are quiet without； unless they
should have been already disturbed by conspiracy； and even should
affairs outside be disturbed； if he has carried out his preparations and
has lived as I have said； as long as he does not despair； he will resist
every attack； as I said Nabis the Spartan did。
But concerning his subjects； when affairs outside are disturbed he has
only to fear that they will conspire secretly； from which a prince can
easily secure himself by avoiding being hated and despised； and by
keeping the people satisfied with him； which it is most necessary for
him to acplish； as I said above at length。 And one of the most
efficacious remedies that a prince can have against conspiracies is not
to be hated and despised by the people； for he who conspires against a
prince always expects to please them by his removal； but when the
conspirator can only look forward to offending them； he will not have
the courage to take such a course； for the difficulties that confront a
conspirator are infinite。 And as experience shows； many have been the
conspiracies； but few have been successful； because he who conspires
cannot act alone； nor can he take a panion except from those whom he
believes to be malcontents； and as soon as you have opened your mind to
a malcontent you have given him the material with which to content
himself； for by denouncing you he can look for every advantage； so that；
seeing the gain from this course to be assured； and seeing the other to
be doubtful and full of dangers； he must be a very rare friend； or a
thoroughly obstinate enemy of the prince； to keep faith with you。
And； to reduce the matter into a small pass； I say that； on the side
of the conspirator； there is nothing but fear； jealousy； prospect of
punishment to terrify him； but on the side of the prince there is the
majesty of the principality； the laws； the protection of friends and the
state to defend him； so that； adding to all these things the popular
goodwill； it is impossible that any one should be so rash as to
conspire。 For whereas in general the conspirator has to fear before the
execution of his plot； in this case he has also to fear the sequel to
the crime； because on account of it he has the people for an enemy； and
thus cannot hope for any escape。
Endless examples could be given on this subject； but I will be content
with one； brought to pass within the memory of our fathers。 Messer
Annibale Bentivoglio； who was prince in Bologna （grandfather of the
present Annibale）； having been murdered by the Canneschi； who had
conspired against him； not one of his family survived but Messer
Giovanni； who was in childhood： immediately after his assassination the
people rose and murdered all the Canneschi。 This sprung from the popular
goodwill which the house of Bentivoglio enjoyed in those days in
Bologna； which was so great that； although none remained there after the
death of Annibale who were able to rule the state； the Bolognese； having
information that there was one of the Bentivoglio family in Florence；
who up to that time had been considered the son of a blacksmith； sent to
Florence for him and gave him the government of their city； and it was
ruled by him until Messer Giovanni came in due course to the government。
For this reason I consider that a prince ought to reckon conspiracies of
little account when his people hold him in esteem； but when it is
hostile to him； and bears hatred towards him； he ought to fear
everything and everybody。 And well…ordered states and wise princes have
taken every care not to drive the nobles to desperation； and to keep the
people satisfied and contented； for this is one of the most important
objects a prince can have。
Among the best ordered and governed kingdoms of our times is France； and
in it are found many good institutions on which depend the liberty and
security of the king； of these the first is the parliament and its
authority； because he who founded the kingdom； knowing the ambition of
the nobility and their boldness； considered that a bit in their mouths
would be necessary to hold them in； and； on the other side； knowing the
hatred of the people； founded in fear； against the nobles； he wished to
protect them； yet he was not anxious for this to be the particular care
of the king； therefore； to take away the reproach which he would be
liable to from the nobles for favouring the people； and from the people
for favouring the nobles； he set up an arbiter； who should be one who
could beat down the great and favour the lesser without reproach to the
king。 Neither could you have a better or a more prudent arrangement； or
a greater source of security to the king and kingdom。 From this one can
draw another important conclusion； that princes ought to leave affairs
of reproach to the management of others； and keep those of grace in
their own hands。 And further； I consider that a prince ought to cherish
the nobles； but not so as to make himself hated by the people。
It may appear； perhaps； to some who have examined the lives and deaths
of the Roman emperors that many of them would be an example contrary to
my opinion； seeing that some of them lived nobly and showed great
qualities of soul； nevertheless they have lost their empire or have been
killed by subjects who have conspired against them。 Wishing； therefore；
to answer these objections； I will recall the characters of some of the
emperors； and will show that the causes of their ruin were not different
to those alleged by me； at the same time I will only submit for
consideration those things that are noteworthy to him who studies the
affairs of those times。
It seems to me sufficient to take all those emperors who succeeded to
the empire from Marcus the philosopher down to Maximinus； they were
Marcus and his son modus； Pertinax； Julian； Severus and his son
Antoninus Caracalla； Macrinus； Heliogabalus； Alexander； and Maximinus。
There is first to note that； whereas in other principalities the
ambition of the nobles and the insolence of the people only have to be
contended with； the Roman emperors had a third difficulty in having to
put up with the cruelty and avarice of their soldiers； a matter so beset
with difficulties that it was the ruin of many； for it was a hard thing
to give satisfaction both to soldiers and people； because the people
loved peace； and for this reason they loved the unaspiring prince；
whilst the soldiers loved the warlike prince who was bold； cruel； and
rapacious； which qualities they were quite willing he should exercise
upon the people； so that they could get double pay and give vent to
their greed and cruelty。 Hence it arose that those emperors were always
overthrown who； either by birth or training； had no great authority； and
most of them； especially those who came new to the principality；
recognizing the difficulty of these two opposing humours； were inclined
to give satisfaction to the soldiers； caring little about injuring the
people。 Which course was necessary； because； as princes cannot help
being hated by someone； they ought； in the first place； to avoid being
hated by every one； and when they cannot pass this； they ought to
endeavour with the utmost diligence to avoid the hatred of the most
powerful。 Therefore； those emperors who through inexperience had need of
special favour adhered more readily to the soldiers than to the people；
a course which turned out advantageous to them or not； accordingly as
the prince knew how to maintain authority over them。
From these causes it arose that Marcus ＇Aurelius＇； Pertinax； and
Alexander； being all men of modest life； lovers of justice； enemies to
cruelty； humane； and benignant； came to a sad end except Marcus； he
alone lived and died honoured； because he had succeeded to the throne by
hereditary title； and owed nothing either to the soldiers or the people；
and afterwards； being possessed of many virtues which made him
respected； he always kept both orders in their places whilst he lived；
and was neither hated nor despised。
But Pertinax was created emperor against the wishes of the soldiers；
who； being accustomed to live licentiously under modus； could not
endure the honest life to which Pertinax wished to reduce them； thus；
having given cause for hatred； to which hatred there was added contempt
for his old age； he was overthrown at the very beginning of his
administration。 And