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solemn banquet to which he invited Giovanni Fogliani and the chiefs of
Fermo。 When the viands and all the other entertainments that are usual
in such banquets were finished； Oliverotto artfully began certain grave
discourses； speaking of the greatness of Pope Alexander and his son
Cesare； and of their enterprises； to which discourse Giovanni and others
answered； but he rose at once； saying that such matters ought to be
discussed in a more private place； and he betook himself to a chamber；
whither Giovanni and the rest of the citizens went in after him。 No
sooner were they seated than soldiers issued from secret places and
slaughtered Giovanni and the rest。 After these murders Oliverotto；
mounted on horseback； rode up and down the town and besieged the chief
magistrate in the palace； so that in fear the people were forced to obey
him； and to form a government； of which he made himself the prince。 He
killed all the malcontents who were able to injure him； and strengthened
himself with new civil and military ordinances； in such a way that； in
the year during which he held the principality； not only was he secure
in the city of Fermo； but he had bee formidable to all his
neighbours。 And his destruction would have been as difficult as that of
Agathocles if he had not allowed himself to be overreached by Cesare
Borgia； who took him with the Orsini and Vitelli at Sinigaglia； as was
stated above。 Thus one year after he had mitted this parricide； he
was strangled； together with Vitellozzo； whom he had made his leader in
valour and wickedness。
Some may wonder how it can happen that Agathocles； and his like； after
infinite treacheries and cruelties； should live for long secure in his
country； and defend himself from external enemies； and never be
conspired against by his own citizens； seeing that many others； by means
of cruelty； have never been able even in peaceful times to hold the
state； still less in the doubtful times of war。 I believe that this
follows from severities being badly or properly used。 Those may be
called properly used； if of evil it is lawful to speak well； that are
applied at one blow and are necessary to one's security； and that are
not persisted in afterwards unless they can be turned to the advantage
of the subjects。 The badly employed are those which； notwithstanding
they may be few in the mencement； multiply with time rather than
decrease。 Those who practise the first system are able； by aid of God or
man； to mitigate in some degree their rule； as Agathocles did。 It is
impossible for those who follow the other to maintain themselves。
Hence it is to be remarked that； in seizing a state； the usurper ought
to examine closely into all those injuries which it is necessary for him
to inflict； and to do them all at one stroke so as not to have to repeat
them daily； and thus by not unsettling men he will be able to reassure
them； and win them to himself by benefits。 He who does otherwise； either
from timidity or evil advice； is always pelled to keep the knife in
his hand； neither can he rely on his subjects； nor can they attach
themselves to him； owing to their continued and repeated wrongs。 For
injuries ought to be done all at one time； so that； being tasted less；
they offend less； benefits ought to be given little by little； so that
the flavour of them may last longer。
And above all things； a prince ought to live amongst his people in such
a way that no unexpected circumstances； whether of good or evil； shall
make him change； because if the necessity for this es in troubled
times； you are too late for harsh measures； and mild ones will not help
you； for they will be considered as forced from you； and no one will be
under any obligation to you for them。
CHAPTER IX
CONCERNING A CIVIL PRINCIPALITY
BUT ing to the other point where a leading citizen bees the
prince of his country； not by wickedness or any intolerable violence；
but by the favour of his fellow citizens this may be called a civil
principality： nor is genius or fortune altogether necessary to attain to
it； but rather a happy shrewdness。 I say then that such a principality
is obtained either by the favour of the people or by the favour of the
nobles。 Because in all cities these two distinct parties are found； and
from this it arises that the people do not wish to be ruled nor
oppressed by the nobles； and the nobles wish to rule and oppress the
people； and from these two opposite desires there arises in cities one
of three results； either a principality； self…government； or anarchy。
A principality is created either by the people or by the nobles；
accordingly as one or other of them has the opportunity； for the nobles；
seeing they cannot withstand the people； begin to cry up the reputation
of one of themselves； and they make him a prince； so that under his
shadow they can give vent to their ambitions。 The people； finding they
cannot resist the nobles； also cry up the reputation of one of
themselves； and make him a prince so as to be defended by his authority。
He who obtains sovereignty by the assistance of the nobles maintains
himself with more difficulty than he who es to it by the aid of the
people； because the former finds himself with many around him who
consider themselves his equals； and because of this he can neither rule
nor manage them to his liking。 But he who reaches sovereignty by popular
favour finds himself alone； and has none around him； or few； who are not
prepared to obey him。
Besides this； one cannot by fair dealing； and without injury to others；
satisfy the nobles； but you can satisfy the people； for their object is
more righteous than that of the nobles； the latter wishing to oppress；
whilst the former only desire not to be oppressed。 It is to be added
also that a prince can never secure himself against a hostile people；
because of their being too many； whilst from the nobles he can secure
himself； as they are few in number。 The worst that a prince may expect
from a hostile people is to be abandoned by them； but from hostile
nobles he has not only to fear abandonment； but also that they will rise
against him； for they； being in these affairs more far…seeing and
astute； always e forward in time to save themselves； and to obtain
favours from him whom they expect to prevail。 Further； the prince is
pelled to live always with the same people； but he can do well
without the same nobles； being able to make and unmake them daily； and
to give or take away authority when it pleases him。
Therefore； to make this point clearer； I say that the nobles ought to be
looked at mainly in two ways： that is to say； they either shape their
course in such a way as binds them entirely to your fortune； or they do
not。 Those who so bind themselves； and are not rapacious； ought to be
honoured and loved； those who do not bind themselves may be dealt with
in two ways； they may fail to do this through pusillanimity and a
natural want of courage； in which case you ought to make use of them；
especially of those who are of good counsel； and thus； whilst in
prosperity you honour yourself； in adversity you have not to fear them。
But when for their own ambitious ends they shun binding themselves； it
is a token that they are giving more thought to themselves than to you；
and a prince ought to guard against such； and to fear them as if they
were open enemies； because in adversity they always help to ruin him。
Therefore； one who bees a prince through the favour of the people
ought to keep them friendly； and this he can easily do seeing they only
ask not to be oppressed by him。 But one who； in opposition to the
people； bees a prince by the favour of the nobles； ought； above
everything； to seek to win the people over to himself； and this he may
easily do if he takes them under his protection。 Because men； when they
receive good from him of whom they were expecting evil； are bound more
closely to their benefactor； thus the people quickly bee more devoted
to him than if he had been raised to the principality by their favours；
and the prince can win their affections in many ways； but as these vary
according to the circumstances one cannot give fixed rules； so I omit
them； but； I repeat； it is necessary for a prince to have the people
friendly； otherwise he has no security in adversity。
Nabis； Prince of the Spartans； sustained the attack of all Greece； and
of a victorious Roman army； and against them he defended his country and
his government； and for the overing of this peril it was only
necessary for him to make himself secure against a few； but this would
not have been sufficient if the people had been hostile。 And do not let
any one impugn this statement with the trite proverb that 'He who builds
on the people； builds on the mud；' for this is true when a private
citizen makes a foundation there； and persuades himself that the people
will free him when he is oppres