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the proper object of respect； and the dignity of humanity consists
just in this capacity of being universally legislative； though with
the condition that it is itself subject to this same legislation。
The Autonomy of the Will as the Supreme Principle of Morality
Autonomy of the will is that property of it by which it is a law
to itself （independently of any property of the objects of
volition）。 The principle of autonomy then is： 〃Always so to choose
that the same volition shall comprehend the maxims of our choice as
a universal law。〃 We cannot prove that this practical rule is an
imperative； i。e。； that the will of every rational being is necessarily
bound to it as a condition； by a mere analysis of the conceptions
which occur in it； since it is a synthetical proposition； we must
advance beyond the cognition of the objects to a critical
examination of the subject； that is； of the pure practical reason； for
this synthetic proposition which commands apodeictically must be
capable of being cognized wholly a priori。 This matter； however；
does not belong to the present section。 But that the principle of
autonomy in question is the sole principle of morals can be readily
shown by mere analysis of the conceptions of morality。 For by this
analysis we find that its principle must be a categorical imperative
and that what this commands is neither more nor less than this very
autonomy。
Heteronomy of the Will as the Source of all spurious Principles
of Morality
If the will seeks the law which is to determine it anywhere else
than in the fitness of its maxims to be universal laws of its own
dictation； consequently if it goes out of itself and seeks this law in
the character of any of its objects； there always results
heteronomy。 The will in that case does not give itself the law； but it
is given by the object through its relation to the will。 This
relation； whether it rests on inclination or on conceptions of reason；
only admits of hypothetical imperatives： 〃I ought to do something
because I wish for something else。〃 On the contrary； the moral； and
therefore categorical； imperative says： 〃I ought to do so and so； even
though I should not wish for anything else。〃 E。g。； the former says： 〃I
ought not to lie； if I would retain my reputation〃； the latter says：
〃I ought not to lie； although it should not bring me the least
discredit。〃 The latter therefore must so far abstract from all objects
that they shall have no influence on the will； in order that practical
reason （will） may not be restricted to administering an interest not
belonging to it； but may simply show its own commanding authority as
the supreme legislation。 Thus； e。g。； I ought to endeavour to promote
the happiness of others； not as if its realization involved any
concern of mine （whether by immediate inclination or by any
satisfaction indirectly gained through reason）； but simply because a
maxim which excludes it cannot be comprehended as a universal law in
one and the same volition。
Classification of all Principles of Morality which can be
founded on the Conception of Heteronomy
Here as elsewhere human reason in its pure use； so long as it was
not critically examined； has first tried all possible wrong ways
before it succeeded in finding the one true way。
All principles which can be taken from this point of view are either
empirical or rational。 The former； drawn from the principle of
happiness； are built on physical or moral feelings； the latter；
drawn from the principle of perfection； are built either on the
rational conception of perfection as a possible effect； or on that
of an independent perfection （the will of God） as the determining
cause of our will。
Empirical principles are wholly incapable of serving as a foundation
for moral laws。 For the universality with which these should hold
for all rational beings without distinction； the unconditional
practical necessity which is thereby imposed on them； is lost when
their foundation is taken from the particular constitution of human
nature； or the accidental circumstances in which it is placed。 The
principle of private happiness； however； is the most objectionable；
not merely because it is false； and experience contradicts the
supposition that prosperity is always proportioned to good conduct；
nor yet merely because it contributes nothing to the establishment
of morality… since it is quite a different thing to make a
prosperous man and a good man； or to make one prudent and
sharp…sighted for his own interests and to make him virtuous… but
because the springs it provides for morality are such as rather
undermine it and destroy its sublimity； since they put the motives
to virtue and to vice in the same class and only teach us to make a
better calculation； the specific difference between virtue and vice
being entirely extinguished。 On the other hand； as to moral feeling；
this supposed special sense；* the appeal to it is indeed superficial
when those who cannot think believe that feeling will help them out；
even in what concerns general laws： and besides； feelings； which
naturally differ infinitely in degree； cannot furnish a uniform
standard of good and evil； nor has anyone a right to form judgements
for others by his own feelings： nevertheless this moral feeling is
nearer to morality and its dignity in this respect； that it pays
virtue the honour of ascribing to her immediately the satisfaction and
esteem we have for her and does not； as it were； tell her to her
face that we are not attached to her by her beauty but by profit。
*I class the principle of moral feeling under that of happiness；
because every empirical interest promises to contribute to our
well…being by the agreeableness that a thing affords； whether it be
immediately and without a view to profit； or whether profit be
regarded。 We must likewise； with Hutcheson； class the principle of
sympathy with the happiness of others under his assumed moral sense。
Amongst the rational principles of morality； the ontological
conception of perfection； notwithstanding its defects； is better
than the theological conception which derives morality from a Divine
absolutely perfect will。 The former is； no doubt； empty and indefinite
and consequently useless for finding in the boundless field of
possible reality the greatest amount suitable for us； moreover； in
attempting to distinguish specifically the reality of which we are now
speaking from every other； it inevitably tends to turn in a circle and
cannot avoid tacitly presupposing the morality which it is to explain；
it is nevertheless preferable to the theological view； first；
because we have no intuition of the divine perfection and can only
deduce it from our own conceptions； the most important of which is
that of morality； and our explanation would thus be involved in a
gross circle； and； in the next place； if we avoid this； the only
notion of the Divine will remaining to us is a conception made up of
the attributes of desire of glory and dominion； combined with the
awful conceptions of might and vengeance； and any system of morals
erected on this foundation would be directly opposed to morality。
However； if I had to choose between the notion of the moral sense
and that of perfection in general （two systems which at least do not
weaken morality； although they are totally incapable of serving as its
foundation）； then I should decide for the latter； because it at
least withdraws the decision of the question from the sensibility
and brings it to the court of pure reason； and although even here it
decides nothing； it at all events preserves the indefinite idea （of
a will good in itself free from corruption； until it shall be more
precisely defined。
For the rest I think I may be excused here from a detailed
refutation of all these doctrines； that would only be superfluous
labour； since it is so easy； and is probably so well seen even by
those whose office requires them to decide for one of these theories
（because their hearers would not tolerate suspension of judgement）。
But what interests us more here is to know that the prime foundation
of morality laid down by all these principles is nothing but
heteronomy of the will； and for this reason they must necessarily miss
their aim。
In every case where an object of the will has to be supposed； in
order that the rule may be prescribed which is to determine the
will； there the rule is simply heteronomy； the imperative is
conditional； namely； if or because one wishes for this object； one
should act so and so： hence it can never command morally； that is；
categorically。 Whether the object determines the will by means of
inclination； as in the principle of private happiness； or by means
of reason directed to objects of our possible volition generally； as
in the principle of perfection； in either case the wil