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a source from whence to give himself a far higher worth than that of a
good…natured temperament could be？ Unquestionably。 It is just in
this that the moral worth of the character is brought out which is
incomparably the highest of all； namely； that he is beneficent； not
from inclination； but from duty。
To secure one's own happiness is a duty； at least indirectly； for
discontent with one's condition； under a pressure of many anxieties
and amidst unsatisfied wants； might easily become a great temptation
to transgression of duty。 But here again； without looking to duty； all
men have already the strongest and most intimate inclination to
happiness； because it is just in this idea that all inclinations are
combined in one total。 But the precept of happiness is often of such a
sort that it greatly interferes with some inclinations； and yet a
man cannot form any definite and certain conception of the sum of
satisfaction of all of them which is called happiness。 It is not
then to be wondered at that a single inclination； definite both as
to what it promises and as to the time within which it can be
gratified； is often able to overcome such a fluctuating idea； and that
a gouty patient； for instance； can choose to enjoy what he likes；
and to suffer what he may； since； according to his calculation； on
this occasion at least； be has not sacrificed the enjoyment of the
present moment to a possibly mistaken expectation of a happiness which
is supposed to be found in health。 But even in this case； if the
general desire for happiness did not influence his will； and supposing
that in his particular case health was not a necessary element in this
calculation； there yet remains in this； as in all other cases； this
law； namely； that he should promote his happiness not from inclination
but from duty； and by this would his conduct first acquire true
moral worth。
It is in this manner； undoubtedly； that we are to understand those
passages of Scripture also in which we are commanded to love our
neighbour； even our enemy。 For love； as an affection； cannot be
commanded； but beneficence for duty's sake may； even though we are not
impelled to it by any inclination… nay； are even repelled by a natural
and unconquerable aversion。 This is practical love and not
pathological… a love which is seated in the will； and not in the
propensions of sense… in principles of action and not of tender
sympathy； and it is this love alone which can be commanded。
The second proposition is： That an action done from duty derives its
moral worth； not from the purpose which is to be attained by it； but
from the maxim by which it is determined； and therefore does not
depend on the realization of the object of the action； but merely on
the principle of volition by which the action has taken place； without
regard to any object of desire。 It is clear from what precedes that
the purposes which we may have in view in our actions； or their
effects regarded as ends and springs of the will； cannot give to
actions any unconditional or moral worth。 In what； then； can their
worth lie； if it is not to consist in the will and in reference to its
expected effect？ It cannot lie anywhere but in the principle of the
will without regard to the ends which can be attained by the action。
For the will stands between its a priori principle； which is formal；
and its a posteriori spring； which is material； as between two
roads； and as it must be determined by something； it that it must be
determined by the formal principle of volition when an action is
done from duty； in which case every material principle has been
withdrawn from it。
The third proposition； which is a consequence of the two
preceding； I would express thus Duty is the necessity of acting from
respect for the law。 I may have inclination for an object as the
effect of my proposed action； but I cannot have respect for it； just
for this reason； that it is an effect and not an energy of will。
Similarly I cannot have respect for inclination； whether my own or
another's； I can at most； if my own； approve it； if another's；
sometimes even love it； i。e。； look on it as favourable to my own
interest。 It is only what is connected with my will as a principle； by
no means as an effect… what does not subserve my inclination； but
overpowers it； or at least in case of choice excludes it from its
calculation… in other words； simply the law of itself； which can be an
object of respect； and hence a command。 Now an action done from duty
must wholly exclude the influence of inclination and with it every
object of the will； so that nothing remains which can determine the
will except objectively the law； and subjectively pure respect for
this practical law； and consequently the maxim* that I should follow
this law even to the thwarting of all my inclinations。
*A maxim is the subjective principle of volition。 The objective
principle （i。e。； that which would also serve subjectively as a
practical principle to all rational beings if reason had full power
over the faculty of desire） is the practical law。
Thus the moral worth of an action does not lie in the effect
expected from it； nor in any principle of action which requires to
borrow its motive from this expected effect。 For all these effects…
agreeableness of one's condition and even the promotion of the
happiness of others… could have been also brought about by other
causes； so that for this there would have been no need of the will
of a rational being； whereas it is in this alone that the supreme
and unconditional good can be found。 The pre…eminent good which we
call moral can therefore consist in nothing else than the conception
of law in itself； which certainly is only possible in a rational
being； in so far as this conception； and not the expected effect；
determines the will。 This is a good which is already present in the
person who acts accordingly； and we have not to wait for it to
appear first in the result。*
*It might be here objected to me that I take refuge behind the
word respect in an obscure feeling； instead of giving a distinct
solution of the question by a concept of the reason。 But although
respect is a feeling； it is not a feeling received through
influence； but is self…wrought by a rational concept； and；
therefore； is specifically distinct from all feelings of the former
kind； which may be referred either to inclination or fear； What I
recognise immediately as a law for me； I recognise with respect。
This merely signifies the consciousness that my will is subordinate to
a law； without the intervention of other influences on my sense。 The
immediate determination of the will by the law； and the
consciousness of this； is called respect； so that this is regarded
as an effect of the law on the subject； and not as the cause of it。
Respect is properly the conception of a worth which thwarts my
self…love。 Accordingly it is something which is considered neither
as an object of inclination nor of fear； although it has something
analogous to both。 The object of respect is the law only； and that the
law which we impose on ourselves and yet recognise as necessary in
itself。 As a law； we are subjected too it without consulting
self…love； as imposed by us on ourselves； it is a result of our
will。 In the former aspect it has an analogy to fear； in the latter to
inclination。 Respect for a person is properly only respect for the law
（of honesty； etc。） of which he gives us an example。 Since we also look
on the improvement of our talents as a duty； we consider that we see
in a person of talents； as it were； the example of a law （viz。； to
become like him in this by exercise）； and this constitutes our
respect。 All so…called moral interest consists simply in respect for
the law。
But what sort of law can that be； the conception of which must
determine the will； even without paying any regard to the effect
expected from it； in order that this will may be called good
absolutely and without qualification？ As I have deprived the will of
every impulse which could arise to it from obedience to any law； there
remains nothing but the universal conformity of its actions to law
in general； which alone is to serve the will as a principle； i。e。； I
am never to act otherwise than so that I could also will that my maxim
should become a universal law。 Here； now； it is the simple
conformity to law in general； without assuming any particular law
applicable to certain actions； that serves the will as its principle
and must so serve it； if duty is not to be a vain delusion and a
chimerical notion。 The common reason of men in its practical
judgements perfectly coincides with this and always has in view the
principle here suggested。 Let the question be； for example： May I when
in distress make a promise with the intention not to keep it？ I
readily distinguish here between the two significations which the
question may