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but if I know that it is only by this process that the intended
operation can be performed； then to say that； if I fully will the
operation； I also will the action required for it； is an analytical
proposition； for it is one and the same thing to conceive something as
an effect which I can produce in a certain way； and to conceive myself
as acting in this way。
If it were only equally easy to give a definite conception of
happiness； the imperatives of prudence would correspond exactly with
those of skill； and would likewise be analytical。 For in this case
as in that； it could be said： 〃Whoever wills the end； wills also
（according to the dictate of reason necessarily） the indispensable
means thereto which are in his power。〃 But； unfortunately； the
notion of happiness is so indefinite that although every man wishes to
at。 it； yet he never can say definitely and consistently what it is
that he really wishes and wills。 The reason of this is that all the
elements which belong to the notion of happiness are altogether
empirical； i。e。； they must be borrowed from experience； and
nevertheless the idea of happiness requires an absolute whole； a
maximum of welfare in my present and all future circumstances。 Now
it is impossible that the most clear…sighted and at the same time most
powerful being （supposed finite） should frame to himself a definite
conception of what he really wills in this。 Does he will riches； how
much anxiety； envy； and snares might he not thereby draw upon his
shoulders？ Does he will knowledge and discernment； perhaps it might
prove to be only an eye so much the sharper to show him so much the
more fearfully the evils that are now concealed from him； and that
cannot be avoided； or to impose more wants on his desires； which
already give him concern enough。 Would he have long life？ who
guarantees to him that it would not be a long misery？ would he at
least have health？ how often has uneasiness of the body restrained
from excesses into which perfect health would have allowed one to
fall？ and so on。 In short； he is unable； on any principle； to
determine with certainty what would make him truly happy； because to
do so he would need to be omniscient。 We cannot therefore act on any
definite principles to secure happiness； but only on empirical
counsels； e。g。 of regimen； frugality； courtesy； reserve； etc。； which
experience teaches do； on the average； most promote well…being。
Hence it follows that the imperatives of prudence do not； strictly
speaking； command at all； that is； they cannot present actions
objectively as practically necessary； that they are rather to be
regarded as counsels （consilia） than precepts precepts of reason； that
the problem to determine certainly and universally what action would
promote the happiness of a rational being is completely insoluble； and
consequently no imperative respecting it is possible which should；
in the strict sense； command to do what makes happy； because happiness
is not an ideal of reason but of imagination； resting solely on
empirical grounds； and it is vain to expect that these should define
an action by which one could attain the totality of a series of
consequences which is really endless。 This imperative of prudence
would however be an analytical proposition if we assume that the means
to happiness could be certainly assigned； for it is distinguished from
the imperative of skill only by this； that in the latter the end is
merely possible； in the former it is given； as however both only
ordain the means to that which we suppose to be willed as an end； it
follows that the imperative which ordains the willing of the means
to him who wills the end is in both cases analytical。 Thus there is no
difficulty in regard to the possibility of an imperative of this
kind either。
On the other hand； the question how the imperative of morality is
possible； is undoubtedly one； the only one； demanding a solution； as
this is not at all hypothetical； and the objective necessity which
it presents cannot rest on any hypothesis； as is the case with the
hypothetical imperatives。 Only here we must never leave out of
consideration that we cannot make out by any example； in other words
empirically； whether there is such an imperative at all； but it is
rather to be feared that all those which seem to be categorical may
yet be at bottom hypothetical。 For instance； when the precept is：
〃Thou shalt not promise deceitfully〃； and it is assumed that the
necessity of this is not a mere counsel to avoid some other evil； so
that it should mean： 〃Thou shalt not make a lying promise； lest if
it become known thou shouldst destroy thy credit；〃 but that an
action of this kind must be regarded as evil in itself； so that the
imperative of the prohibition is categorical； then we cannot show with
certainty in any example that the will was determined merely by the
law； without any other spring of action； although it may appear to
be so。 For it is always possible that fear of disgrace； perhaps also
obscure dread of other dangers； may have a secret influence on the
will。 Who can prove by experience the non…existence of a cause when
all that experience tells us is that we do not perceive it？ But in
such a case the so…called moral imperative； which as such appears to
be categorical and unconditional； would in reality be only a pragmatic
precept； drawing our attention to our own interests and merely
teaching us to take these into consideration。
We shall therefore have to investigate a priori the possibility of a
categorical imperative； as we have not in this case the advantage of
its reality being given in experience； so that ＇the elucidation of＇
its possibility should be requisite only for its explanation； not
for its establishment。 In the meantime it may be discerned
beforehand that the categorical imperative alone has the purport of
a practical law； all the rest may indeed be called principles of the
will but not laws； since whatever is only necessary for the attainment
of some arbitrary purpose may be considered as in itself contingent；
and we can at any time be free from the precept if we give up the
purpose； on the contrary； the unconditional command leaves the will no
liberty to choose the opposite； consequently it alone carries with
it that necessity which we require in a law。
Secondly； in the case of this categorical imperative or law of
morality； the difficulty （of discerning its possibility） is a very
profound one。 It is an a priori synthetical practical proposition；*
and as there is so much difficulty in discerning the possibility of
speculative propositions of this kind； it may readily be supposed that
the difficulty will be no less with the practical。
*I connect the act with the will without presupposing any
condition resulting from any inclination； but a priori； and
therefore necessarily （though only objectively； i。e。； assuming the
idea of a reason possessing full power over all subjective motives）。
This is accordingly a practical proposition which does not deduce
the willing of an action by mere analysis from another already
presupposed （for we have not such a perfect will）； but connects it
immediately with the conception of the will of a rational being； as
something not contained in it。
In this problem we will first inquire whether the mere conception of
a categorical imperative may not perhaps supply us also with the
formula of it； containing the proposition which alone can be a
categorical imperative； for even if we know the tenor of such an
absolute command； yet how it is possible will require further
special and laborious study； which we postpone to the last section。
When I conceive a hypothetical imperative； in general I do not
know beforehand what it will contain until I am given the condition。
But when I conceive a categorical imperative； I know at once what it
contains。 For as the imperative contains besides the law only the
necessity that the maxims* shall conform to this law； while the law
contains no conditions restricting it； there remains nothing but the
general statement that the maxim of the action should conform to a
universal law； and it is this conformity alone that the imperative
properly represents as necessary。
*A maxim is a subjective principle of action； and must be
distinguished from the objective principle； namely； practical law。 The
former contains the practical rule set by reason according to the
conditions of the subject （often its ignorance or its inclinations）；
so that it is the principle on which the subject acts； but the law
is the objective principle valid for every rational being； and is
the principle on which it ought to act that is an imperative。
There is therefore but one categorical imperative； namely； this： Act
only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it
should become a universal law。
Now if all imperatives of duty can be de