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evidence of mathematical truths is that all the argument is on one
side。 There are no objections； and no answers to objections。 But on
every subject on which difference of opinion is possible； the truth
depends on a balance to be struck between two sets of conflicting
reasons。 Even in natural philosophy； there is always some other
explanation possible of the same facts； some geocentric theory instead
of heliocentric； some phlogiston instead of oxygen； and it has to be
shown why that other theory cannot be the true one： and until this
is shown； and until we know how it is shown； we do not understand
the grounds of our opinion。
But when we turn to subjects infinitely more complicated； to morals；
religion； politics； social relations； and the business of life；
three…fourths of the arguments for every disputed opinion consist in
dispelling the appearances which favour some opinion different from
it。 The greatest orator； save one； of antiquity； has left it on record
that he always studied his adversary's case with as great； if not
still greater； intensity than even his own。 What Cicero practised as
the means of forensic success requires to be imitated by all who study
any subject in order to arrive at the truth。 He who knows only his own
side of the case； knows little of that。 His reasons may be good； and
no one may have been able to refute them。 But if he is equally
unable to refute the reasons on the opposite side； if he does not so
much as know what they are； he has no ground for preferring either
opinion。 The rational position for him would be suspension of
judgment； and unless he contents himself with that； he is either led
by authority； or adopts； like the generality of the world； the side to
which he feels most inclination。 Nor is it enough that he should
hear the arguments of adversaries from his own teachers； presented
as they state them； and accompanied by what they offer as refutations。
That is not the way to do justice to the arguments； or bring them into
real contact with his own mind。 He must be able to hear them from
persons who actually believe them； who defend them in earnest； and
do their very utmost for them。 He must know them in their most
plausible and persuasive form； he must feel the whole force of the
difficulty which the true view of the subject has to encounter and
dispose of； else he will never really possess himself of the portion
of truth which meets and removes that difficulty。
Ninety…nine in a hundred of what are called educated men are in this
condition； even of those who can argue fluently for their opinions。
Their conclusion may be true； but it might be false for anything
they know： they have never thrown themselves into the mental
position of those who think differently from them； and considered what
such persons may have to say； and consequently they do not； in any
proper sense of the word； know the doctrine which they themselves
profess。 They do not know those parts of it which explain and
justify the remainder； the considerations which show that a fact which
seemingly conflicts with another is reconcilable with it； or that；
of two apparently strong reasons； one and not the other ought to be
preferred。 All that part of the truth which turns the scale； and
decides the judgment of a completely informed mind； they are strangers
to； nor is it ever really known； but to those who have attended
equally and impartially to both sides； and endeavoured to see the
reasons of both in the strongest light。 So essential is this
discipline to a real understanding of moral and human subjects； that
if opponents of all important truths do not exist； it is indispensable
to imagine them； and supply them with the strongest arguments which
the most skilful devil's advocate can conjure up。
To abate the force of these considerations； an enemy of free
discussion may be supposed to say； that there is no necessity for
mankind in general to know and understand all that can be said against
or for their opinions by philosophers and theologians。 That it is
not needful for common men to be able to expose all the
misstatements or fallacies of an ingenious opponent。 That it is enough
if there is always somebody capable of answering them； so that nothing
likely to mislead uninstructed persons remains unrefuted。 That
simple minds； having been taught the obvious grounds of the truths
inculcated on them； may trust to authority for the rest； and being
aware that they have neither knowledge nor talent to resolve every
difficulty which can be raised； may repose in the assurance that all
those which have been raised have been or can be answered； by those
who are specially trained to the task。
Conceding to this view of the subject the utmost that can be claimed
for it by those most easily satisfied with the amount of understanding
of truth which ought to accompany the belief of it； even so； the
argument for free discussion is no way weakened。 For even this
doctrine acknowledges that mankind ought to have a rational
assurance that all objections have been satisfactorily answered； and
how are they to be answered if that which requires to be answered is
not spoken？ or how can the answer be known to be satisfactory； if
the objectors have no opportunity of showing that it is
unsatisfactory？ If not the public； at least the philosophers and
theologians who are to resolve the difficulties； must make
themselves familiar with those difficulties in their most puzzling
form； and this cannot be accomplished unless they are freely stated；
and placed in the most advantageous light which they admit of。 The
Catholic Church has its own way of dealing with this embarrassing
problem。 It makes a broad separation between those who can be
permitted to receive its doctrines on conviction； and those who must
accept them on trust。 Neither； indeed； are allowed any choice as to
what they will accept； but the clergy； such at least as can be fully
confided in； may admissibly and meritoriously make themselves
acquainted with the arguments of opponents； in order to answer them；
and may； therefore； read heretical books； the laity； not unless by
special permission； hard to be obtained。 This discipline recognises
a knowledge of the enemy's case as beneficial to the teachers； but
finds means； consistent with this； of denying it to the rest of the
world： thus giving to the elite more mental culture； though not more
mental freedom； than it allows to the mass。 By this device it succeeds
in obtaining the kind of mental superiority which its purposes
require； for though culture without freedom never made a large and
liberal mind； it can make a clever nisi prius advocate of a cause。 But
in countries professing Protestantism； this resource is denied；
since Protestants hold； at least in theory； that the responsibility
for the choice of a religion must be borne by each for himself； and
cannot be thrown off upon teachers。 Besides； in the present state of
the world； it is practically impossible that writings which are read
by the instructed can be kept from the uninstructed。 If the teachers
of mankind are to be cognisant of all that they ought to know；
everything must be free to be written and published without restraint。
If； however； the mischievous operation of the absence of free
discussion； when the received opinions are true； were confined to
leaving men ignorant of the grounds of those opinions； it might be
thought that this； if an intellectual； is no moral evil； and does
not affect the worth of the opinions； regarded in their influence on
the character。 The fact； however； is； that not only the grounds of the
opinion are forgotten in the absence of discussion； but too often
the meaning of the opinion itself。 The words which convey it cease
to suggest ideas； or suggest only a small portion of those they were
originally employed to communicate。 Instead of a vivid conception
and a living belief； there remain only a few phrases retained by rote；
or； if any part； the shell and husk only of the meaning is retained；
the finer essence being lost。 The great chapter in human history which
this fact occupies and fills； cannot be too earnestly studied and
meditated on。
It is illustrated in the experience of almost all ethical
doctrines and religious creeds。 They are all full of meaning and
vitality to those who originate them； and to the direct disciples of
the originators。 Their meaning continues to be felt in undiminished
strength； and is perhaps brought out into even fuller consciousness；
so long as the struggle lasts to give the doctrine or creed an
ascendancy over other creeds。 At last it either prevails； and
becomes the general opinion； or i