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But much more of the meaning even of these would have been understood；
and what was understood would have been far more deeply impressed on
the mind； if the man had been accustomed to hear it argued pro and con
by people who did understand it。 The fatal tendency of mankind to
leave off thinking about a thing when it is no longer doubtful； is the
cause of half their errors。 A contemporary author has well spoken of
〃the deep slumber of a decided opinion。〃
But what！ （it may be asked） Is the absence of unanimity an
indispensable condition of true knowledge？ Is it necessary that some
part of mankind should persist in error to enable any to realise the
truth？ Does a belief cease to be real and vital as soon as it is
generally received… and is a proposition never thoroughly understood
and felt unless some doubt of it remains？ As soon as mankind have
unanimously accepted a truth； does the truth perish within them？ The
highest aim and best result of improved intelligence； it has
hitherto been thought； is to unite mankind more and more in the
acknowledgment of all important truths； and does the intelligence only
last as long as it has not achieved its object？ Do the fruits of
conquest perish by the very completeness of the victory？
I affirm no such thing。 As mankind improve； the number of
doctrines which are no longer disputed or doubted will be constantly
on the increase： and the well…being of mankind may almost be
measured by the number and gravity of the truths which have reached
the point of being uncontested。 The cessation； on one question after
another； of serious controversy； is one of the necessary incidents
of the consolidation of opinion； a consolidation as salutary in the
case of true opinions； as it is dangerous and noxious when the
opinions are erroneous。 But though this gradual narrowing of the
bounds of diversity of opinion is necessary in both senses of the
term； being at once inevitable and indispensable； we are not therefore
obliged to conclude that all its consequences must be beneficial。
The loss of so important an aid to the intelligent and living
apprehension of a truth； as is afforded by the necessity of explaining
it to； or defending it against； opponents； though not sufficient to
outweigh； is no trifling drawback from； the benefit of its universal
recognition。 Where this advantage can no longer be had； I confess I
should like to see the teachers of mankind endeavouring to provide a
substitute for it； some contrivance for making the difficulties of the
question as present to the learner's consciousness； as if they were
pressed upon him by a dissentient champion； eager for his conversion。
But instead of seeking contrivances for this purpose； they have lost
those they formerly had。 The Socratic dialectics； so magnificently
exemplified in the dialogues of Plato； were a contrivance of this
description。 They were essentially a negative discussion of the
great question of philosophy and life； directed with consummate
skill to the purpose of convincing any one who had merely adopted
the commonplaces of received opinion that he did not understand the
subject… that he as yet attached no definite meaning to the doctrines
he professed； in order that； becoming aware of his ignorance； he might
be put in the way to obtain a stable belief； resting on a clear
apprehension both of the meaning of doctrines and of their evidence。
The school disputations of the Middle Ages had a somewhat similar
object。 They were intended to make sure that the pupil understood
his own opinion； and （by necessary correlation） the opinion opposed to
it； and could enforce the grounds of the one and confute those of
the other。 These last…mentioned contests had indeed the incurable
defect； that the premises appealed to were taken from authority； not
from reason； and； as a discipline to the mind； they were in every
respect inferior to the powerful dialectics which formed the
intellects of the 〃Socratici viri〃； but the modern mind owes far
more to both than it is generally willing to admit； and the present
modes of education contain nothing which in the smallest degree
supplies the place either of the one or of the other。 A person who
derives all his instruction from teachers or books； even if he
escape the besetting temptation of contenting himself with cram； is
under no compulsion to hear both sides； accordingly it is far from a
frequent accomplishment； even among thinkers； to know both sides；
and the weakest part of what everybody says in defence of his
opinion is what he intends as a reply to antagonists。
It is the fashion of the present time to disparage negative
logic… that which points out weaknesses in theory or errors in
practice； without establishing positive truths。 Such negative
criticism would indeed be poor enough as an ultimate result； but as
a means to attaining any positive knowledge or conviction worthy the
name； it cannot be valued too highly； and until people are again
systematically trained to it； there will be few great thinkers； and
a low general average of intellect； in any but the mathematical and
physical departments of speculation。 On any other subject no one's
opinions deserve the name of knowledge； except so far as he has either
had forced upon him by others； or gone through of himself； the same
mental process which would have been required of him in carrying on an
active controversy with opponents。 That； therefore； which when absent；
it is so indispensable； but so difficult； to create； how worse than
absurd it is to forego； when spontaneously offering itself！ If there
are any persons who contest a received opinion； or who will do so if
law or opinion will let them； let us thank them for it； open our minds
to listen to them； and rejoice that there is some one to do for us
what we otherwise ought； if we have any regard for either the
certainty or the vitality of our convictions； to do with much
greater labour for ourselves。
It still remains to speak of one of the principal causes which
make diversity of opinion advantageous； and will continue to do so
until mankind shall have entered a stage of intellectual advancement
which at present seems at an incalculable distance。 We have hitherto
considered only two possibilities： that the received opinion may be
false； and some other opinion； consequently； true； or that； the
received opinion being true； a conflict with the opposite error is
essential to a clear apprehension and deep feeling of its truth。 But
there is a commoner case than either of these； when the conflicting
doctrines； instead of being one true and the other false； share the
truth between them； and the nonconforming opinion is needed to
supply the remainder of the truth； of which the received doctrine
embodies only a part。 Popular opinions； on subjects not palpable to
sense； are often true； but seldom or never the whole truth。 They are a
part of the truth； sometimes a greater； sometimes a smaller part；
but exaggerated； distorted； and disjointed from the truths by which
they ought to be accompanied and limited。 Heretical opinions； on the
other hand； are generally some of these suppressed and neglected
truths； bursting the bonds which kept them down； and either seeking
reconciliation with the truth contained in the common opinion； or
fronting it as enemies； and setting themselves up； with similar
exclusiveness； as the whole truth。 The latter case is hitherto the
most frequent； as； in the human mind； one…sidedness has always been
the rule； and many…sidedness the exception。 Hence； even in revolutions
of opinion； one part of the truth usually sets while another rises。
Even progress； which ought to superadd； for the most part only
substitutes； one partial and incomplete truth for another； improvement
consisting chiefly in this； that the new fragment of truth is more
wanted； more adapted to the needs of the time； than that which it
displaces。 Such being the partial character of prevailing opinions；
even when resting on a true foundation； every opinion which embodies
somewhat of the portion of truth which the common opinion omits； ought
to be considered precious； with whatever amount of error and confusion
that truth may be blended。 No sober judge of human affairs will feel
bound to be indignant because those who force on our notice truths
which we should otherwise have overlooked； overlook some of those
which we see。 Rather； he will think that so long as popular truth is
one…sided； it is more desirable than otherwise that unpopular truth
should have one…sided assertors too； such being usually the most
energetic； and the most likely to compel reluctant attention to the
fragment of wisd