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The will of the people； moreover； practically means the will of the
most numerous or the most active part of the people； the majority；
or those who succeed in making themselves accepted as the majority；
the people； consequently may desire to oppress a part of their number；
and precautions are as much needed against this as against any other
abuse of power。 The limitation； therefore； of the power of
government over individuals loses none of its importance when the
holders of power are regularly accountable to the community； that
is； to the strongest party therein。 This view of things；
recommending itself equally to the intelligence of thinkers and to the
inclination of those important classes in European society to whose
real or supposed interests democracy is adverse； has had no difficulty
in establishing itself； and in political speculations 〃the tyranny
of the majority〃 is now generally included among the evils against
which society requires to be on its guard。
Like other tyrannies； the tyranny of the majority was at first；
and is still vulgarly； held in dread； chiefly as operating through the
acts of the public authorities。 But reflecting persons perceived
that when society is itself the tyrant… society collectively over the
separate individuals who compose it… its means of tyrannising are not
restricted to the acts which it may do by the hands of its political
functionaries。 Society can and does execute its own mandates： and if
it issues wrong mandates instead of right； or any mandates at all in
things with which it ought not to meddle； it practises a social
tyranny more formidable than many kinds of political oppression；
since； though not usually upheld by such extreme penalties； it
leaves fewer means of escape； penetrating much more deeply into the
details of life； and enslaving the soul itself。 Protection； therefore；
against the tyranny of the magistrate is not enough： there needs
protection also against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and
feeling； against the tendency of society to impose； by other means
than civil penalties； its own ideas and practices as rules of
conduct on those who dissent from them； to fetter the development；
and； if possible； prevent the formation； of any individuality not in
harmony with its ways； and compels all characters to fashion
themselves upon the model of its own。 There is a limit to the
legitimate interference of collective opinion with individual
independence： and to find that limit； and maintain it against
encroachment； is as indispensable to a good condition of human
affairs； as protection against political despotism。
But though this proposition is not likely to be contested in general
terms； the practical question； where to place the limit… how to make
the fitting adjustment between individual independence and social
control… is a subject on which nearly everything remains to be done。
All that makes existence valuable to any one； depends on the
enforcement of restraints upon the actions of other people。 Some rules
of conduct； therefore； must be imposed； by law in the first place； and
by opinion on many things which are not fit subjects for the operation
of law。 What these rules should be is the principal question in
human affairs； but if we except a few of the most obvious cases； it is
one of those which least progress has been made in resolving。 No two
ages； and scarcely any two countries； have decided it alike； and the
decision of one age or country is a wonder to another。 Yet the
people of any given age and country no more suspect any difficulty
in it； than if it were a subject on which mankind had always been
agreed。 The rules which obtain among themselves appear to them
self…evident and self…justifying。
This all but universal illusion is one of the examples of the
magical influence of custom； which is not only； as the proverb says； a
second nature； but is continually mistaken for the first。 The effect
of custom； in preventing any misgiving respecting the rules of conduct
which mankind impose on one another； is all the more complete
because the subject is one on which it is not generally considered
necessary that reasons should be given； either by one person to others
or by each to himself。 People are accustomed to believe； and have been
encouraged in the belief by some who aspire to the character of
philosophers； that their feelings； on subjects of this nature； are
better than reasons； and render reasons unnecessary。 The practical
principle which guides them to their opinions on the regulation of
human conduct； is the feeling in each person's mind that everybody
should be required to act as he； and those with whom he sympathises；
would like them to act。 No one； indeed； acknowledges to himself that
his standard of judgment is his own liking； but an opinion on a
point of conduct； not supported by reasons； can only count as one
person's preference； and if the reasons； when given； are a mere appeal
to a similar preference felt by other people； it is still only many
people's liking instead of one。 To an ordinary man； however； his own
preference； thus supported； is not only a perfectly satisfactory
reason； but the only one he generally has for any of his notions of
morality； taste； or propriety； which are not expressly written in
his religious creed； and his chief guide in the interpretation even of
that。 Men's opinions； accordingly； on what is laudable or blamable；
are affected by all the multifarious causes which influence their
wishes in regard to the conduct of others； and which are as numerous
as those which determine their wishes on any other subject。
Sometimes their reason… at other times their prejudices or
superstitions： often their social affections； not seldom their
antisocial ones； their envy or jealousy； their arrogance or
contemptuousness： but most commonly their desires or fears for
themselves… their legitimate or illegitimate self…interest。
Wherever there is an ascendant class； a large portion of the
morality of the country emanates from its class interests； and its
feelings of class superiority。 The morality between Spartans and
Helots； between planters and negroes； between princes and subjects；
between nobles and roturiers； between men and women； has been for
the most part the creation of these class interests and feelings：
and the sentiments thus generated react in turn upon the moral
feelings of the members of the ascendant class； in their relations
among themselves。 Where； on the other hand； a class； formerly
ascendant； has lost its ascendancy； or where its ascendancy is
unpopular； the prevailing moral sentiments frequently bear the impress
of an impatient dislike of superiority。 Another grand determining
principle of the rules of conduct； both in act and forbearance；
which have been enforced by law or opinion； has been the servility
of mankind towards the supposed preferences or aversions of their
temporal masters or of their gods。 This servility； though
essentially selfish； is not hypocrisy； it gives rise to perfectly
genuine sentiments of abhorrence； it made men burn magicians and
heretics。 Among so many baser influences； the general and obvious
interests of society have of course had a share； and a large one； in
the direction of the moral sentiments： less； however； as a matter of
reason； and on their own account； than as a consequence of the
sympathies and antipathies which grew out of them： and sympathies
and antipathies which had little or nothing to do with the interests
of society； have made themselves felt in the establishment of
moralities with quite as great force。
The likings and dislikings of society； or of some powerful portion
of it； are thus the main thing which has practically determined the
rules laid down for general observance； under the penalties of law
or opinion。 And in general； those who have been in advance of
society in thought and feeling； have left this condition of things
unassailed in principle； however they may have come into conflict with
it in some of its details。 They have occupied themselves rather in
inquiring what things society ought to like or dislike； than in
questioning whether its likings or dislikings should be a law to
individuals。 They preferred endeavouring to alter the feelings of
mankind on the particular points on which they were themselves
heretical； rather than make common cause in defence of freedom； with
heretics generally。 The only case in which the higher ground has
been taken on principle and maintained with consistency； by any but an
individual here and there； is that of religious belief： a case
instructive in many ways； and not least so as forming a most