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particularly concerns it。 To individuality should belong the part of
life in which it is chiefly the individual that is interested； to
society； the part which chiefly interests society。
Though society is not founded on a contract； and though no good
purpose is answered by inventing a contract in order to deduce
social obligations from it； every one who receives the protection of
society owes a return for the benefit； and the fact of living in
society renders it indispensable that each should be bound to
observe a certain line of conduct towards the rest。 This conduct
consists； first； in not injuring the interests of one another； or
rather certain interests； which； either by express legal provision
or by tacit understanding； ought to be considered as rights； and
secondly； in each person's bearing his share （to be fixed on some
equitable principle） of the labours and sacrifices incurred for
defending the society or its members from injury and molestation。
These conditions society is justified in enforcing； at all costs to
those who endeavour to withhold fulfilment。 Nor is this all that
society may do。 The acts of an individual may be hurtful to others； or
wanting in due consideration for their welfare； without going to the
length of violating any of their constituted rights。 The offender
may then be justly punished by opinion； though not by law。 As soon
as any part of a person's conduct affects prejudicially the
interests of others； society has jurisdiction over it； and the
question whether the general welfare will or will not be promoted by
interfering with it； becomes open to discussion。 But there is no
room for entertaining any such question when a person's conduct
affects the interests of no persons besides himself； or needs not
affect them unless they like （all the persons concerned being of
full age； and the ordinary amount of understanding）。 In all such
cases； there should be perfect freedom； legal and social； to do the
action and stand the consequences。
It would be a great misunderstanding of this doctrine to suppose
that it is one of selfish indifference； which pretends that human
beings have no business with each other's conduct in life； and that
they should not concern themselves about the well…doing or
well…being of one another； unless their own interest is involved。
Instead of any diminution； there is need of a great increase of
disinterested exertion to promote the good of others。 But
disinterested benevolence can find other instruments to persuade
people to their good than whips and scourges； either of the literal or
the metaphorical sort。 I am the last person to undervalue the
self…regarding virtues； they are only second in importance； if even
second； to the social。 It is equally the business of education to
cultivate both。 But even education works by conviction and
persuasion as well as by compulsion； and it is by the former only
that； when the period of education is passed； the self…regarding
virtues should be inculcated。 Human beings owe to each other help to
distinguish the better from the worse； and encouragement to choose the
former and avoid the latter。 They should be for ever stimulating
each other to increased exercise of their higher faculties； and
increased direction of their feelings and aims towards wise instead of
foolish； elevating instead of degrading； objects and contemplations。
But neither one person； nor any number of persons； is warranted in
saying to another human creature of ripe years； that he shall not do
with his life for his own benefit what he chooses to do with it。 He is
the person most interested in his own well…being： the interest which
any other person； except in cases of strong personal attachment； can
have in it； is trifling； compared with that which he himself has；
the interest which society has in him individually （except as to his
conduct to others） is fractional； and altogether indirect； while
with respect to his own feelings and circumstances； the most
ordinary man or woman has means of knowledge immeasurably surpassing
those that can be possessed by any one else。 The interference of
society to overrule his judgment and purposes in what only regards
himself must be grounded on general presumptions； which may be
altogether wrong； and even if right； are as likely as not to be
misapplied to individual cases； by persons no better acquainted with
the circumstances of such cases than those are who look at them merely
from without。 In this department； therefore； of human affairs；
Individuality has its proper field of action。 In the conduct of
human beings towards one another it is necessary that general rules
should for the most part be observed； in order that people may know
what they have to expect： but in each person's own concerns his
individual spontaneity is entitled to free exercise。 Considerations to
aid his judgment； exhortations to strengthen his will； may be
offered to him； even obtruded on him； by others： but he himself is the
final judge。 All errors which he is likely to commit against advice
and warning are far outweighed by the evil of allowing others to
constrain him to what they deem his good。
I do not mean that the feelings with which a person is regarded by
others ought not to be in any way affected by his self…regarding
qualities or deficiencies。 This is neither possible nor desirable。
If he is eminent in any of the qualities which conduce to his own
good； he is； so far； a proper object of admiration。 He is so much
the nearer to the ideal perfection of human nature。 If he is grossly
deficient in those qualities； a sentiment the opposite of admiration
will follow。 There is a degree of folly； and a degree of what may be
called （though the phrase is not unobjectionable） lowness or
depravation of taste； which； though it cannot justify doing harm to
the person who manifests it； renders him necessarily and properly a
subject of distaste； or； in extreme cases； even of contempt： a
person could not have the opposite qualities in due strength without
entertaining these feelings。 Though doing no wrong to any one； a
person may so act as to compel us to judge him； and feel to him； as
a fool； or as a being of an inferior order： and since this judgment
and feeling are a fact which he would prefer to avoid； it is doing him
a service to warn him of it beforehand； as of any other disagreeable
consequence to which he exposes himself。 It would be well； indeed；
if this good office were much more freely rendered than the common
notions of politeness at present permit； and if one person could
honestly point out to another that he thinks him in fault； without
being considered unmannerly or presuming。 We have a right； also； in
various ways； to act upon our unfavourable opinion of any one； not
to the oppression of his individuality； but in the exercise of ours。
We are not bound； for example； to seek his society； we have a right to
avoid it （though not to parade the avoidance）； for we have a right
to choose the society most acceptable to us。 We have a right； and it
may be our duty； to caution others against him； if we think his
example or conversation likely to have a pernicious effect on those
with whom he associates。 We may give others a preference over him in
optional good offices； except those which tend to his improvement。
In these various modes a person may suffer very severe penalties at
the hands of others for faults which directly concern only himself；
but he suffers these penalties only in so far as they are the
natural and； as it were； the spontaneous consequences of the faults
themselves； not because they are purposely inflicted on him for the
sake of punishment。 A person who shows rashness； obstinacy；
self…conceit… who cannot live within moderate means… who cannot
restrain himself from hurtful indulgences… who pursues animal
pleasures at the expense of those of feeling and intellect… must
expect to be lowered in the opinion of others； and to have a less
share of their favourable sentiments； but of this he has no right to
complain； unless he has merited their favour by special excellence in
his social relations； and has thus established a title to their good
offices； which is not affected by his demerits towards himself。
What I contend for is； that the inconveniences which are strictly
inseparable from the unfavourable judgment of others； are the only
ones to which a person should ever be subjected for that portion of
his conduct and character which concerns his own good； but which
does not affect the interest of others in their relations with him。
Acts injurious to others require a totally different treatment。
Encroachment on their rig