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Acts injurious to others require a totally different treatment。
Encroachment on their rights； infliction on them of any loss or damage
not justified by his own rights； falsehood or duplicity in dealing
with them； unfair or ungenerous use of advantages over them； even
selfish abstinence from defending them against injury… these are fit
objects of moral reprobation； and； in grave cases； of moral
retribution and punishment。 And not only these acts； but the
dispositions which lead to them； are properly immoral； and fit
subjects of disapprobation which may rise to abhorrence。 Cruelty of
disposition； malice and ill…nature； that most anti…social and odious
of all passions； envy； dissimulation and insincerity； irascibility
on insufficient cause； and resentment disproportioned to the
provocation； the love of domineering over others； the desire to
engross more than one's share of advantages （the pleonexia of the
Greeks）； the pride which derives gratification from the abasement of
others； the egotism which thinks self and its concerns more
important than everything else； and decides all doubtful questions
in its own favour；… these are moral vices； and constitute a bad and
odious moral character： unlike the self…regarding faults previously
mentioned； which are not properly immoralities； and to whatever
pitch they may be carried； do not constitute wickedness。 They may be
proofs of any amount of folly； or want of personal dignity and
self…respect； but they are only a subject of moral reprobation when
they involve a breach of duty to others； for whose sake the individual
is bound to have care for himself。 What are called duties to ourselves
are not socially obligatory； unless circumstances render them at the
same time duties to others。 The term duty to oneself； when it means
anything more than prudence； means self…respect or self…development；
and for none of these is any one accountable to his fellow
creatures； because for none of them is it for the good of mankind that
he be held accountable to them。
The distinction between the loss of consideration which a person may
rightly incur by defect of prudence or of personal dignity； and the
reprobation which is due to him for an offence against the rights of
others； is not a merely nominal distinction。 It makes a vast
difference both in our feelings and in our conduct towards him whether
he displeases us in things in which we think we have a right to
control him； or in things in which we know that we have not。 If he
displeases us； we may express our distaste； and we may stand aloof
from a person as well as from a thing that displeases us； but we shall
not therefore feel called on to make his life uncomfortable。 We
shall reflect that he already bears； or will bear； the whole penalty
of his error； if he spoils his life by mismanagement； we shall not；
for that reason； desire to spoil it still further： instead of
wishing to punish him； we shall rather endeavour to alleviate his
punishment； by showing him how he may avoid or cure the evils his
conduct tends to bring upon him。 He may be to us an object of pity；
perhaps of dislike； but not of anger or resentment； we shall not treat
him like an enemy of society： the worst we shall think ourselves
justified in doing is leaving him to himself； if we do not interfere
benevolently by showing interest or concern for him。 It is far
otherwise if he has infringed the rules necessary for the protection
of his fellow creatures； individually or collectively。 The evil
consequences of his acts do not then fall on himself； but on others；
and society； as the protector of all its members； must retaliate on
him； must inflict pain on him for the express purpose of punishment；
and must take care that it be sufficiently severe。 In the one case； he
is an offender at our bar； and we are called on not only to sit in
judgment on him； but； in one shape or another； to execute our own
sentence： in the other case； it is not our part to inflict any
suffering on him； except what may incidentally follow from our using
the same liberty in the regulation of our own affairs； which we
allow to him in his。
The distinction here pointed out between the part of a person's life
which concerns only himself； and that which concerns others； many
persons will refuse to admit。 How （it may be asked） can any part of
the conduct of a member of society be a matter of indifference to
the other members？ No person is an entirely isolated being； it is
impossible for a person to do anything seriously or permanently
hurtful to himself； without mischief reaching at least to his near
connections； and often far beyond them。 If he injures his property； he
does harm to those who directly or indirectly derived support from it；
and usually diminishes； by a greater or less amount； the general
resource； of the community。 If he deteriorates his bodily or mental
faculties； he not only brings evil upon all who depended on him for
any portion of their happiness； but disqualifies himself for rendering
the services which he owes to his fellow creatures generally；
perhaps becomes a burthen on their affection or benevolence； and if
such conduct were very frequent； hardly any offence that is
committed would detract more from the general sum of good。 Finally； if
by his vices or follies a person does no direct harm to others； he
is nevertheless （it may be said） injurious by his example； and ought
to be compelled to control himself； for the sake of those whom the
sight or knowledge of his conduct might corrupt or mislead。
And even （it will be added） if the consequences of misconduct
could be confined to the vicious or thoughtless individual； ought
society to abandon to their own guidance those who are manifestly
unfit for it？ If protection against themselves is confessedly due to
children and persons under age； is not society equally bound to afford
it to persons of mature years who are equally incapable of
self…government？ If gambling； or drunkenness； or incontinence； or
idleness； or uncleanliness； are as injurious to happiness； and as
great a hindrance to improvement； as many or most of the acts
prohibited by law； why （it may be asked） should not law； so far as
is consistent with practicability and social convenience； endeavour to
repress these also？ And as a supplement to the unavoidable
imperfections of law； ought not opinion at least to organise a
powerful police against these vices； and visit rigidly with social
penalties those who are known to practise them？ There is no question
here （it may be said） about restricting individuality； or impeding the
trial of new and original experiments in living。 The only things it is
sought to prevent are things which have been tried and condemned
from the beginning of the world until now； things which experience has
shown not to be useful or suitable to any person's individuality。
There must be some length of time and amount of experience after which
a moral or prudential truth may be regarded as established： and it
is merely desired to prevent generation after generation from
falling over the same precipice which has been fatal to their
predecessors。
I fully admit that the mischief which a person does to himself may
seriously affect； both through their sympathies and their interests；
those nearly connected with him and； in a minor degree； society at
large。 When； by conduct of this sort； a person is led to violate a
distinct and assignable obligation to any other person or persons； the
case is taken out of the self…regarding class； and becomes amenable to
moral disapprobation in the proper sense of the term。 If； for example；
a man； through intemperance or extravagance； becomes unable to pay his
debts； or； having undertaken the moral responsibility of a family；
becomes from the same cause incapable of supporting or educating them；
he is deservedly reprobated； and might be justly punished； but it is
for the breach of duty to his family or creditors； not for the
extravagance。 If the resources which ought to have been devoted to
them； had been diverted from them for the most prudent investment； the
moral culpability would have been the same。 George Barnwell murdered
his uncle to get money for his mistress； but if he had done it to
set himself up in business； he would equally have been hanged。
Again； in the frequent case of a man who causes grief to his family by
addiction to bad habits； he deserves reproach for his unkindness or
ingratitude； but so he may for cultivating habits not in themselves
vicious； if they are painful to those with whom he passes his life；
who from personal ties are dependent on him for their comfort。 Whoever
fails in the cons