按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
who from personal ties are dependent on him for their comfort。 Whoever
fails in the consideration generally due to the interests and feelings
of others； not being compelled by some more imperative duty； or
justified by allowable self…preference； is a subject of moral
disapprobation for that failure； but not for the cause of it； nor
for the errors； merely personal to himself； which may have remotely
led to it。 In like manner； when a person disables himself； by
conduct purely self…regarding； from the performance of some definite
duty incumbent on him to the public； he is guilty of a social offence。
No person ought to be punished simply for being drunk； but a soldier
or a policeman should be punished for being drunk on duty。 Whenever；
in short； there is a definite damage； or a definite risk of damage；
either to an individual or to the public； the case is taken out of the
province of liberty； and placed in that of morality or law。
But with regard to the merely contingent； or； as it may be called；
constructive injury which a person causes to society； by conduct which
neither violates any specific duty to the public； nor occasions
perceptible hurt to any assignable individual except himself； the
inconvenience is one which society can afford to bear； for the sake of
the greater good of human freedom。 If grown persons are to be punished
for not taking proper care of themselves； I would rather it were for
their own sake； than under pretence of preventing them from
impairing their capacity or rendering to society benefits which
society does not pretend it has a right to exact。 But I cannot consent
to argue the point as if society had no means of bringing its weaker
members up to its ordinary standard of rational conduct； except
waiting till they do something irrational； and then punishing them；
legally or morally； for it。 Society has had absolute power over them
during all the early portion of their existence： it has had the
whole period of childhood and nonage in which to try whether it
could make them capable of rational conduct in life。 The existing
generation is master both of the training and the entire circumstances
of the generation to come； it cannot indeed make them perfectly wise
and good； because it is itself so lamentably deficient in goodness and
wisdom； and its best efforts are not always； in individual cases；
its most successful ones； but it is perfectly well able to make the
rising generation； as a whole； as good as； and a little better than；
itself。 If society lets any considerable number of its members grow up
mere children； incapable of being acted on by rational consideration
of distant motives； society has itself to blame for the
consequences。 Armed not only with all the powers of education； but
with the ascendency which the authority of a received opinion always
exercises over the minds who are least fitted to judge for themselves；
and aided by the natural penalties which cannot be prevented from
falling on those who incur the distaste or the contempt of those who
know them； let not society pretend that it needs； besides all this；
the power to issue commands and enforce obedience in the personal
concerns of individuals； in which； on all principles of justice and
policy； the decision ought to rest with those who are to abide the
consequences。
Nor is there anything which tends more to discredit and frustrate
the better means of influencing conduct than a resort to the worse。 If
there be among those whom it is attempted to coerce into prudence or
temperance any of the material of which vigorous and independent
characters are made； they will infallibly rebel against the yoke。 No
such person will ever feel that others have a right to control him
in his concerns； such as they have to prevent him from injuring them
in theirs； and it easily comes to be considered a mark of spirit and
courage to fly in the face of such usurped authority； and do with
ostentation the exact opposite of what it enjoins； as in the fashion
of grossness which succeeded； in the time of Charles II。； to the
fanatical moral intolerance of the Puritans。 With respect to what is
said of the necessity of protecting society from the bad example set
to others by the vicious or the self…indulgent； it is true that bad
example may have a pernicious effect； especially the example of
doing wrong to others with impunity to the wrong…doer。 But we are
now speaking of conduct which； while it does no wrong to others； is
supposed to do great harm to the agent himself： and I do not see how
those who believe this can think otherwise than that the example； on
the whole； must be more salutary than hurtful； since； if it displays
the misconduct； it displays also the painful or degrading consequences
which； if the conduct is justly censured； must be supposed to be in
all or most cases attendant on it。
But the strongest of all the arguments against the interference of
the public with purely personal conduct is that； when it does
interfere； the odds are that it interferes wrongly； and in the wrong
place。 On questions of social morality； of duty to others； the opinion
of the public； that is； of an overruling majority； though of wrong； is
likely to be still oftener right； because on such questions they are
only required to judge of their own interests； of the manner in
which some mode of conduct； if allowed to be practised； would effect
themselves。 But the opinion of a similar majority； imposed as a law on
the minority； on questions of self…regarding conduct； is quite as
likely to be wrong as right； for in these cases public opinion
means； at the best； some people's opinion of what is good or bad for
other people； while very of it does not even mean that； the public；
with the most perfect indifference； passing over the pleasure or
convenience of those whose conduct they censure； and considering
only their own preference。 There are many who consider as an injury to
themselves any conduct which they have a distaste for； and resent it
as an outrage to their feelings； as a religious bigot； when charged
with disregarding the religious feelings of others； has been known
to retort that they disregard his feelings； by persisting in their
abominable worship or creed。 But there is no parity between the
feeling of a person for his own opinion； and the feeling of another
who is offended at his holding it； no more than between the desire
of a thief to take a purse； and the desire of the right owner to
keep it。 And a person's taste is as much his own peculiar concern as
his opinion or his purse。 It is easy for any one to imagine an ideal
public which leaves the freedom and choice of individuals in all
uncertain matters undisturbed； and only requires them to abstain
from modes of conduct which universal experience has condemned。 But
where has there been seen a public which set any such limit to its
censorship？ or when does the public trouble itself about universal
experience？ In its interferences with personal conduct it is seldom
thinking of anything but the enormity of acting or feeling differently
from itself； and this standard of judgment； thinly disguised； is
held up to mankind as the dictate of religion and philosophy； by
nine…tenths of all moralists and speculative writers。 These teach that
things are right because they are right； because we feel them to be
so。 They tell us to search in our own minds and hearts for laws of
conduct binding on ourselves and on all others。 What can the poor
public do but apply these instructions； and make their own personal
feelings of good and evil； if they are tolerably unanimous in them；
obligatory on all the world？
The evil here pointed out is not one which exists only in theory；
and it may perhaps be expected that I should specify the instances
in which the public of this age and country improperly invests its own
preferences with the character of moral laws。 I am not writing an
essay on the aberrations of existing moral feeling。 That is too
weighty a subject to be discussed parenthetically； and by way of
illustration。 Yet examples are necessary to show that the principle
I maintain is of serious and practical moment； and that I am not
endeavouring to erect a barrier against imaginary evils。 And it is not
difficult to show； by abundant instances； that to extend the bounds of
what may be called moral police； until it encroaches on the most
unquestionably legitimate liberty of the individual； is one of the
most universal of all human propensities。
As a first instance； consider the antipathies which men cherish on
no better grounds than that persons whose religious opinions are
different from theirs do not practise