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individuals to regulate by mutual agreement such things as regard them
jointly； and regard no persons but themselves。 This question
presents no difficulty； so long as the will of all the persons
implicated remains unaltered； but since that will may change； it is
often necessary； even in things in which they alone are concerned；
that they should enter into engagements with one another； and when
they do； it is fit； as a general rule； that those engagements should
be kept。 Yet； in the laws； probably； of every country； this general
rule has some exceptions。 Not only persons are not held to engagements
which violate the rights of third parties； but it is sometimes
considered a sufficient reason for releasing them from an
engagement； that it is injurious to themselves。 In this and most other
civilised countries； for example； an engagement by which a person
should sell himself； or allow himself to be sold； as a slave； would be
null and void； neither enforced by law nor by opinion。 The ground
for thus limiting his power of voluntarily disposing of his own lot in
life； is apparent； and is very clearly seen in this extreme case。
The reason for not interfering； unless for the sake of others； with
a person's voluntary acts； is consideration for his liberty。 His
voluntary choice is evidence that what he so chooses is desirable；
or at least endurable； to him； and his good is on the whole best
provided for by allowing him to take his own means of pursuing it。 But
by selling himself for a slave； be abdicates his liberty； he
foregoes any future use of it beyond that single act。 He therefore
defeats； in his own case； the very purpose which is the
justification of allowing him to dispose of himself。 He is no longer
free； but is thenceforth in a position which has no longer the
presumption in its favour； that would be afforded by his voluntarily
remaining in it。 The principle of freedom cannot require that he
should be free not to be free。 It is not freedom to be allowed to
alienate his freedom。 These reasons； the force of which is so
conspicuous in this peculiar case； are evidently of far wider
application； yet a limit is everywhere set to them by the
necessities of life； which continually require； not indeed that we
should resign our freedom； but that we should consent to this and
the other limitation of it。 The principle； however； which demands
uncontrolled freedom of action in all that concerns only the agents
themselves； requires that those who have become bound to one
another； in things which concern no third party； should be able to
release one another from the engagement： and even without such
voluntary release there are perhaps no contracts or engagements；
except those that relate to money or money's worth； of which one can
venture to say that there ought to be no liberty whatever of
retractation。
Baron Wilhelm von Humboldt； in the excellent essay from which I have
already quoted； states it as his conviction； that engagements which
involve personal relations or services should never be legally binding
beyond a limited duration of time； and that the most important of
these engagements； marriage； having the peculiarity that its objects
are frustrated unless the feelings of both the parties are in
harmony with it； should require nothing more than the declared will of
either party to dissolve it。 This subject is too important； and too
complicated； to be discussed in a parenthesis； and I touch on it
only so far as is necessary for purposes of illustration。 If the
conciseness and generality of Baron Humboldt's dissertation had not
obliged him in this instance to content himself with enunciating his
conclusion without discussing the premises； he would doubtless have
recognised that the question cannot be decided on grounds so simple as
those to which he confines himself。 When a person； either by express
promise or by conduct； has encouraged another to rely upon his
continuing to act in a certain way… to build expectations and
calculations； and stake any part of his plan of life upon that
supposition… a new series of moral obligations arises on his part
towards that person； which may possibly be overruled； but cannot be
ignored。 And again； if the relation between two contracting parties
has been followed by consequences to others； if it has placed third
parties in any peculiar position； or； as in the case of marriage；
has even called third parties into existence； obligations arise on the
part of both the contracting parties towards those third persons；
the fulfilment of which； or at all events the mode of fulfilment； must
be greatly affected by the continuance or disruption of the relation
between the original parties to the contract。 It does not follow；
nor can I admit； that these obligations extend to requiring the
fulfilment of the contract at all costs to the happiness of the
reluctant party； but they are a necessary element in the question； and
even if； as Von Humboldt maintains； they ought to make no difference
in the legal freedom of the parties to release themselves from the
engagement （and I also hold that they ought not to make much
difference）； they necessarily make a great difference in the moral
freedom。 A person is bound to take all these circumstances into
account before resolving on a step which may affect such important
interests of others； and if he does not allow proper weight to those
interests； he is morally responsible for the wrong。 I have made
these obvious remarks for the better illustration of the general
principle of liberty； and not because they are at all needed on the
particular question； which； on the contrary； is usually discussed as
if the interest of children was everything； and that of grown
persons nothing。
I have already observed that； owing to the absence of any recognised
general principles； liberty is often granted where it should be
withheld； as well as withheld where it should be granted； and one of
the cases in which； in the modern European world； the sentiment of
liberty is the strongest； is a case where； in my view； it is
altogether misplaced。 A person should be free to do as he likes in his
own concerns； but he ought not to be free to do as he likes in
acting for another； under the pretext that the affairs of the other
are his own affairs。 The State； while it respects the liberty of
each in what specially regards himself； is bound to maintain a
vigilant control over his exercise of any power which it allows him to
possess over others。 This obligation is almost entirely disregarded in
the case of the family relations； a case； in its direct influence on
human happiness； more important than all others taken together。 The
almost despotic power of husbands over wives needs not be enlarged
upon here； because nothing more is needed for the complete removal
of the evil than that wives should have the same rights； and should
receive the protection of law in the same manner； as all other
persons； and because； on this subject； the defenders of established
injustice do not avail themselves of the plea of liberty； but stand
forth openly as the champions of power。 It is in the case of
children that misapplied notions of liberty are a real obstacle to the
fulfilment by the State of its duties。 One would almost think that a
man's children were supposed to be literally； and not
metaphorically； a part of himself； so jealous is opinion of the
smallest interference of law with his absolute and exclusive control
over them； more jealous than of almost any interference with his own
freedom of action： so much less do the generality of mankind value
liberty than power。 Consider； for example； the case of education。 Is
it not almost a self…evident axiom； that the State should require
and compel the education； up to a certain standard； of every human
being who is born its citizen？ Yet who is there that is not afraid
to recognise and assert this truth？ Hardly any one indeed will deny
that it is one of the most sacred duties of the parents （or； as law
and usage now stand； the father）； after summoning a human being into
the world； to give to that being an education fitting him to perform
his part well in life towards others and towards himself。 But while
this is unanimously declared to be the father's duty； scarcely
anybody； in this country； will bear to hear of obliging him to perform
it。 Instead of his being required to make any exertion or sacrifice
for securing education to his child； it is left to his choice to
accept it or not when it is provided gratis！ It still remains
unrecognised； that to bring a child into existence without a fair
prospect of being able； not only to provide food for