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democratical frenzy。
Secondly； Public stocks； being a kind of paper…credit； have
all the disadvantages attending that species of money。 They
banish gold and silver from the most considerable commerce of the
state； reduce them to common circulation； and by that means
render all provisions and labour dearer than otherwise they would
be。
Thirdly； The taxes； which are levied to pay the interests of
these debts； are apt either to heighten the price of labour； or
be an oppression on the poorer sort。
Fourthly； As foreigners possess a great share of our national
funds； they render the public； in a manner； tributary to them；
and may in time occasion the transport of our people and our
industry。
Fifthly； The greater part of the public stock being always in
the hands of idle people； who live on their revenue； our funds；
in that view； give great encouragement to an useless and unactive
life。
But though the injury； that arises to commerce and industry
from our public funds； will appear； upon balancing the whole； not
inconsiderable； it is trivial； in comparison of the prejudice
that results to the state considered as a body politic； which
must support itself in the society of nations； and have various
transactions with other states in wars and negociations。 The ill；
there； is pure and unmixed； without any favourable circumstance
to atone for it； and it is an ill too of a nature the highest and
most important。
We have； indeed； been told； that the public is no weaker upon
account of its debts； since they are mostly due among ourselves；
and bring as much property to one as they take from another。 It
is like transferring money from the right hand to the left； which
leaves the person neither richer nor poorer than before。 Such
loose reasonings and specious comparisons will always pass； where
we judge not upon principles。 I ask； Is it possible； in the
nature of things； to overburthen a nation with taxes； even where
the sovereign resides among them？ The very doubt seems
extravagant； since it is requisite； in every community； that
there be a certain proportion observed between the laborious and
the idle part of it。 But if all our present taxes be mortgaged；
must we not invent new ones？ And may not this matter be carried
to a length that is ruinous and destructive？
In every nation； there are always some methods of levying
money more easy than others； agreeably to the way of living of
the people； and the commodities they make use of。 In GREAT
BRITAIN； the excises upon malt and beer afford a large revenue；
because the operations of malting and brewing are tedious； and
are impossible to be concealed； and at the same time； these
commodities are not so absolutely necessary to life； as that the
raising of their price would very much affect the poorer sort。
These taxes being all mortgaged； what difficulty to find new
ones！ what vexation and ruin of the poor！
Duties upon consumptions are more equal and easy than those
upon possessions。 What a loss to the public； that the former are
all exhausted； and that we must have recourse to the more
grievous method of levying taxes！
Were all the proprietors of land only stewards to the public；
must not necessity force them to practise all the arts of
oppression used by stewards； where the absence or negligence of
the proprietor render them secure against enquiry？
It will scarcely be asserted； that no bounds ought ever to be
set to national debts； and that the public would be no weaker；
were twelve or fifteen shillings in the pound； land…tax；
mortgaged； with all the present customs and excises。 There is
something； therefore； in the case； beside the mere transferring
of property from the one hand to another。 In 500 years； the
posterity of those now in the coaches； and of those upon the
boxes； will probably have changed places； without affecting the
public by these revolutions。
Suppose the public once fairly brought to that condition； to
which it is hastening with such amazing rapidity； suppose the
land to be taxed eighteen or nineteen shillings in the pound； for
it can never bear the whole twenty； suppose all the excises and
customs to be screwed up to the utmost which the nation can bear；
without entirely losing its commerce and industry； and suppose
that all those funds are mortgaged to perpetuity； and that the
invention and wit of all our projectors can find no new
imposition； which may serve as the foundation of a new loan； and
let us consider the necessary consequences of this situation。
Though the imperfect state of our political knowledge； and the
narrow capacities of men； make it difficult to fortel the effects
which will result from any untried measure； the seeds of ruin are
here scattered with such profusion as not to escape the eye of
the most careless observer。
In this unnatural state of society； the only persons； who
possess any revenue beyond the immediate effects of their
industry； are the stock…holders； who draw almost all the rent of
the land and houses； besides the produce of all the customs and
excises。 These are men； who have no connexions with the state；
who can enjoy their revenue in any part of the globe in which
they chuse to reside； who will naturally bury themselves in the
capital or in great cities； and who will sink into the lethargy
of a stupid and pampered luxury； without spirit； ambition； or
enjoyment。 Adieu to all ideas of nobility； gentry； and family。
The stocks can be transferred in an instant； and being in such a
fluctuating state； will seldom be transmitted during three
generations from father to son。 Or were they to remain ever so
long in one family； they convey no hereditary authority or credit
to the possessor； and by this means； the several ranks of men；
which form a kind of independent magistracy in a state；
instituted by the hand of nature； are entirely lost； and every
man in authority derives his influence from the commission alone
of the sovereign。 No expedient remains for preventing or
suppressing insurrections； but mercenary armies： No expedient at
all remains for resisting tyranny。 Elections are swayed by
bribery and corruption alone： And the middle power between king
and people being totally removed； a grievous despotism must
infallibly prevail。 The landholders； despised for their poverty；
and hated for their oppressions； will be utterly unable to make
any opposition to it。
Though a resolution should be formed by the legislature never
to impose any tax which hurts commerce and discourages industry；
it will be impossible for men； in subjects of such extreme
delicacy； to reason so justly as never to be mistaken； or amidst
difficulties so urgent； never to be seduced from their
resolution。 The continual fluctuations in commerce require
continual alterations in the nature of the taxes； which exposes
the legislature every moment to the danger both of wilful and
involuntary error。 And any great blow given to trade； whether by
injudicious taxes or by other accidents； throws the whole system
of government into confusion。
But what expedient can the public now employ； even supposing
trade to continue in the most flourishing condition； in order to
support its foreign wars and enterprizes； and to defend its own
honour and interests； or those of its allies？ I do not ask how
the public is to exert such a prodigious power as it has
maintained during our late wars； where we have so much exceeded；
not only our own natural strength； but even that of the greatest
empires。 This extravagance is the abuse complained of； as the
source of all the dangers； to which we are at present exposed。
But since we must still suppose great commerce and opulence to
remain； even after every fund is mortgaged； these riches must be
defended by proportional power； and whence is the public to
derive the revenue which supports it？ It must plainly be from a
continual taxation of the annuitants； or； which is the same
thing； from mortgaging anew； on every exigency； a certain part of
their annuities； and thus making them contribute to their own
defence； and to that of the nation。 But the difficulties；
attending this system of policy； will easily appear； whether we
suppose the king to have become absolute master； or to be still
controuled by national councils； in which the annuitants
themselves must necessarily bear the principal sway。
If the prince has become absolute； as may naturally be
expected from this situation of affairs； it is so easy for him to
encrease his exactions upon the annuitants； which amount only to
the retaining money in his own hands； that this species of
property would soon lose all its credit； and the whole income of
every individual in the state must lie entirely at the mercy of
the sovereign： A degree of despotism； which no oriental monarchy
has ever yet attained。 If； on the contrary； the consent of the
annuitants be requisite for every taxation； they will never be
persuaded to contribute sufficiently even to the support of
government； as the diminution of their revenue must in that case
be very sensible； would not be disguised under the appearance of
a branch of excise or customs； and would not be