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THE SCIENCE OF RIGHT
by Immanual Kant
translated by W。 Hastie
INTRODUCTION TO THE SCIENCE OF RIGHT。
GENERAL DEFINITIONS； AND DIVISIONS。
A。 What the Science of Right is。
The Science of Right has for its object the principles of all the
laws which it is possible to promulgate by external legislation。 Where
there is such a legislation； it becomes； in actual application to
it； a system of positive right and law； and he who is versed in the
knowledge of this system is called a jurist or jurisconsult
（jurisconsultus）。 A practical jurisconsult （jurisperitus）； or a
professional lawyer； is one who is skilled in the knowledge of
positive external laws； and who can apply them to cases that may occur
in experience。 Such practical knowledge of positive right； and law；
may be regarded as belonging to jurisprudence （jurisprudentia） in
the original sense of the term。 But the theoretical knowledge of right
and law in principle； as distinguished from positive laws and
empirical cases； belongs to the pure science of right （jurisscientia）。
The science of right thus designates the philosophical and
systematic knowledge of the principles of natural right。 And it is
from this science that the immutable principles of all positive
legislation must be derived by practical jurists and lawgivers。
B。 What is Right？
This question may be said to be about as embarrassing to the
jurist as the well…known question； 〃What is truth？〃 is to the
logician。 It is all the more so； if； on reflection； he strives to
avoid tautology in his reply and recognise the fact that a reference
to what holds true merely of the laws of some one country at a
particular time is not a solution of the general problem thus
proposed。 It is quite easy to state what may be right in particular
cases （quid sit juris）； as being what the laws of a certain place
and of a certain time say or may have said； but it is much more
difficult to determine whether what they have enacted is right in
itself； and to lay down a universal criterion by which right and wrong
in general； and what is just and unjust； may be recognised。 All this
may remain entirely hidden even from the practical jurist until he
abandon his empirical principles for a time and search in the pure
reason for the sources of such judgements； in order to lay a real
foundation for actual positive legislation。 In this search； his
empirical laws may； indeed； furnish him with excellent guidance； but a
merely empirical system that is void of rational principles is； like
the wooden head in the fable of Phaedrus； fine enough in appearance；
but unfortunately it wants brain。
1。 The conception of right… as referring to a corresponding
obligation which is the moral aspect of it… in the first place； has
regard only to the external and practical relation of one person to
another； in so far as they can have influence upon each other；
immediately or mediately； by their actions as facts。 2。 In the
second place； the conception of right does not indicate the relation
of the action of an individual to the wish or the mere desire of
another； as in acts of benevolence or of unkindness； but only the
relation of his free action to the freedom of action of the other。
3。 And； in the third place； in this reciprocal relation of voluntary
actions； the conception of right does not take into consideration
the matter of the matter of the act of will in so far as the end which
any one may have in view in willing it is concerned。 In other words；
it is not asked in a question of right whether any one on buying goods
for his own business realizes a profit by the transaction or not；
but only the form of the transaction is taken into account； in
considering the relation of the mutual acts of will。 Acts of will or
voluntary choice are thus regarded only in so far as they are free；
and as to whether the action of one can harmonize with the freedom
of another； according to a universal law。
Right； therefore； comprehends the whole of the conditions under
which the voluntary actions of any one person can be harmonized in
reality with the voluntary actions of every other person； according to
a universal law of freedom。
C。 Universal Principle of Right。
〃Every action is right which in itself； or in the maxim on which
it proceeds； is such that it can coexist along with the freedom of the
will of each and all in action； according to a universal law。〃
If； then； my action or my condition generally can coexist with the
freedom of every other； according to a universal law； any one does
me a wrong who hinders me in the performance of this action； or in the
maintenance of this condition。 For such a hindrance or obstruction
cannot coexist with freedom according to universal laws。
It follows also that it cannot be demanded as a matter of right；
that this universal principle of all maxims shall itself be adopted as
my maxim； that is； that I shall make it the maxim of my actions。 For
any one may be free； although his freedom is entirely indifferent to
me； or even if I wished in my heart to infringe it； so long as I do
not actually violate that freedom by my external action。 Ethics；
however； as distinguished from jurisprudence； imposes upon me the
obligation to make the fulfillment of right a maxim of my conduct。
The universal law of right may then be expressed thus： 〃Act
externally in such a manner that the free exercise of thy will may
be able to coexist with the freedom of all others； according to a
universal law。〃 This is undoubtedly a law which imposes obligation
upon me； but it does not at all imply and still less command that I
ought； merely on account of this obligation； to limit my freedom to
these very conditions。 Reason in this connection says only that it
is restricted thus far by its idea； and may be likewise thus limited
in fact by others； and it lays this down as a postulate which is not
capable of further proof。 As the object in view is not to teach
virtue； but to explain what right is； thus far the law of right； as
thus laid down； may not and should not be represented as a
motive…principle of action。
D。 Right is Conjoined with the Title or Authority to Compel。
The resistance which is opposed to any hindrance of an effect is
in reality a furtherance of this effect and is in accordance with
its accomplishment。 Now； everything that is wrong is a hindrance of
freedom； according to universal laws； and compulsion or constraint
of any kind is a hindrance or resistance made to freedom。
Consequently； if a certain exercise of freedom is itself a hindrance
of the freedom that is according to universal laws； it is wrong； and
the compulsion of constraint which is opposed to it is right； as being
a hindering of a hindrance of freedom； and as being in accord with the
freedom which exists in accordance with universal laws。 Hence；
according to the logical principle of contradiction； all right is
accompanied with an implied title or warrant to bring compulsion to
bear on any one who may violate it in fact。
E。 Strict Right may be also Represented as the Possibility
of a Universal Reciprocal Compulsion in harmony with
the Freedom of All according to Universal Laws。
This proposition means the right is not to be regarded as composed
of two different elements… obligation according to a law； and a
title on the part of one who has bound another by his own free
choice to compel him to perform。 But it imports that the conception of
right may be viewed as consisting immediately in the possibility of
a universal reciprocal compulsion； in harmony with the freedom of all。
As right in general has for its object only what is external in
actions； strict right； as that with which nothing ethical is
intermingled； requires no other motives of action than those that
are merely external； for it is then pure right and is unmixed with any
prescriptions of virtue。 A strict right； then； in the exact sense of
the term； is that which alone can be called wholly external。 Now
such right is founded； no doubt； upon the consciousness of the
obligation of every individual according to the law； but if it is to
be pure as such； it neither may nor should refer to this consciousness
as a motive by which to determine the free act of the will。 For this
purpose； however； it founds upon the principle of the possibility of
an external compulsion； such as may coexist with the freedom of
every one according to universal laws。 Accordingly； then； where it
is said that a creditor has a right to demand from a debtor the
payment of his debt； this does not mean merely that he can bring him
to feel in his mind that reason obliges him to do this； but it means
that he can