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so。 It is； however； absolutely impossible to give any further proof of
the categorical imperative implied； just as it is impossible for the
geometrician to prove by rational syllogisms that in order to
construct a triangle I must take three lines… so far an analytical
proposition… of which three lines any two together must be greater
than the third… a synthetical proposition； and like the former a
priori。 It is a postulate of the pure reason that we ought to abstract
from all the sensible conditions of space and time in reference to the
conception of right； and the theory of the possibility of such
abstraction from these conditions； without taking away the reality
of the possession； just constitutes the transcendental deduction of
the conception of acquisition by contract。 It is quite akin to what
was presented under the last title； as the theory of acquisition by
occupation of the external object。
20。 What is Acquired by Contract。
But what is that； designated as external； which I acquire by
contract？ As it is only the causality of the active will of another；
in respect of the performance of something promised to me； I do not
immediately acquire thereby an external thing； but an act of the
will in question； whereby a thing is brought under my power so that
I make it mine。 By the contract； therefore； I acquire the promise of
another； as distinguished from the thing promised； and yet something
is thereby added to my having and possession。 I have become the richer
in possession （locupletior） by the acquisition of an active obligation
that I can bring to bear upon the freedom and capability of another。
This my right； however； is only a personal right； valid only to the
effect of acting upon a particular physical person and specially
upon the causality of his will； so that he shall perform something for
me。 It is not a real right upon that moral person； which is identified
with the idea of the united will of all viewed a priori； and through
which alone I can acquire a right valid against every possessor of the
thing。 For； it is in this that all right in a thing consists。
The transfer or transmission of what is mine to another by contract；
takes place according to the law of continuity （lex continui）。
Possession of the object is not interrupted for a moment during this
act； for； otherwise； I would acquire an object in this state as a
thing that had no possessor； and it would thus be acquired originally；
which is contrary to the idea of a contract。 This continuity； however；
implies that it is not the particular will of either the promiser or
the acceptor； but their united will in common； that transfers what
is mine to another。 And hence it is not accomplished in such a
manner that the promiser first relinquishes （derelinquit） his
possession for the benefit of another； or renounces his right
（renunciat）； and thereupon the other at the same time enters upon
it； or conversely。 The transfer （translatio） is therefore an act in
which the object belongs for a moment at the same time to both； just
as in the parabolic path of a projectile the object on reaching its
highest point may be regarded for a moment as at the same time both
rising and falling； and as thus passing in fact from the ascending
to the falling motion。
21。 Acceptance and Delivery。
A thing is not acquired in a case of contract by the acceptance
（acceptatio） of the promise； but only by the delivery （traditio） of
the object promised。 For all promise is relative to performance； and
if what was promised is a thing； the performance cannot be executed
otherwise than by an act whereby the acceptor is put by the promiser
into possession of the thing； and this is delivery。 Before the
delivery and the reception of the thing； the performance of the act
required has not yet taken place； the thing has not yet passed from
the one person to the other and； consequently； has not been acquired
by that other。 Hence the right arising from a contract is only a
personal right； and it only becomes a real right by delivery。
A contract upon which delivery immediately follows （pactum re
initum） excludes any interval of time between its conclusion and its
execution； and as such it requires no further particular act in the
future by which one person may transfer to another what is his。 But if
there is a time… definite or indefinite… agreed upon between them
for the delivery； the question then arises whether the thing has
already before that time become the acceptor's by the contract； so
that his right is a right in the thing； or whether a further special
contract regarding the delivery alone must be entered upon； so that
the right that is acquired by mere acceptance is only a personal
right； and thus it does not become a right in the thing until
delivery？ That the relation must be determined according to the latter
alternative will be clear from what follows。
Suppose I conclude a contract about a thing that I wish to
acquire… such as a horse… and that I take it immediately into my
stable； or otherwise into my possession； then it is mine （vi pacti
re initi）； and my right is a right in the thing。 But if I leave it
in the hands of the seller without arranging with him specially in
whose physical possession or holding （detentio） this thing shall be
before my taking possession of it （apprehensio）； and consequently；
before the actual change of possession； the horse is not yet mine； and
the right which I acquire is only a right against a particular person…
namely； the seller of the horse… to be put into possession of the
object （poscendi traditionem） as the subjective condition of any use
of it at my will。 My right is thus only a personal right to demand
from the seller the performance of his promise （praestatio） to put
me into possession of the thing。 Now； if the contract does not contain
the condition of delivery at the same time… as a pactum re initum… and
consequently an interval of time intervenes between the conclusion
of the contract and the taking possession of the object of
acquisition； I cannot obtain possession of it during this interval
otherwise than by exercising the particular juridical activity
called a possessory act （actum possessorium）； which constitutes a
special contract。 This act consists in my saying； 〃I will send to
fetch the horse；〃 to which the seller has to agree。 For it is not
self…evident or universally reasonable that any one will take a
thing destined for the use of another into his charge at his own risk。
On the contrary； a special contract is necessary for this arrangement；
according to which the alienator of a thing continues to be its
owner during a certain definite time； and must bear the risk of
whatever may happen to it； while the acquirer can only be regarded
by the seller as the owner when he has delayed to enter into
possession beyond the date at which he agreed to take delivery。
Prior to the possessory act； therefore； all that is acquired by the
contract is only a personal right； and the acceptor can acquire an
external thing only by delivery。
SECTION III。 Principles of Personal Right that is Real
in Kind。 （Jus Realiter Personale）。
22。 Nature of Personal Right of a Real Kind。
Personal right of a real kind is the right to the possession of an
external object as a thing； and to the use of it as a person。 The mine
and thine embraced under this right relate specially to the family and
household； and the relations involved are those of free beings in
reciprocal real interaction with each other。 Through their relations
and influence as persons upon one another； in accordance with the
principle of external freedom as the cause of it； they form a
society composed as a whole of members standing in community with each
other as persons； and this constitutes the household。 The mode in
which this social status is acquired by individuals； and the functions
which prevail within it； proceed neither by arbitrary individual
action （facto）； nor by mere contract （pacto）； but by law （lege）。 And
this law as being not only a right； but also as constituting
possession in reference to a person； is a right rising above all
mere real and personal right。 It must； in fact； form the right of
humanity in our own person； and； as such； it has as its consequence
a natural permissive law； by the favour of which such acquisition
becomes possible to us。
23。 What is acquired in the household。
The acquisition that is founded upon this law is； as regards its
objects； threefold。 The man acquires a wife； the husband and wife
acquire children； constituting a family； and the family acquire
domestics。 All these objects； while acquirable； are inalienable； and
the right of possession in these objects is the most strictly personal
of all rights。
The Rights of the Family as a Domestic Soc