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maltreats the garrison on marching out； or otherwise violates the
agreement； cannot complain of injury or wrong if on another occasion
the same treatment is inflicted upon themselves。 But； in fact； all
such actions fundamentally involve the commission of wrong and
injustice； in the highest degree； because they take all validity
away from the conception of right； and give up everything； as it
were by law itself； to savage violence； and thus overthrow the
rights of men generally。
SECOND PART。 PUBLIC RIGHT。
THE SYSTEM OF THOSE LAWS WHICH REQUIRE PUBLIC PROMULGATION。
THE PRINCIPLES OF RIGHT IN CIVIL SOCIETY。
43。 Definition and Division of Public Right。
Public right embraces the whole of the laws that require to be
universally promulgated in order to produce juridical state of
society。 It is therefore a system of those laws that are requisite for
a people as a multitude of men forming a nation； or for a number of
nations； in their relations to each other。 Men and nations； on account
of their mutual influence on one another； require a juridical
constitution uniting them under one will； in order that they may
participate in what is right。 This relation of the individuals of a
nation to each other constitutes the civil union in the social
state； and； viewed as a whole in relation to its constituent
members； it forms the political state （civitas）。
1。 The state； as constituted by the common interest of all to live
in a juridical union； is called； in view of its form； the commonwealth
or the republic in the wider sense of the term （res publica latius sic
dicta）。 The principles of right in this sphere thus constitute the
first department of public right as the right of the state （jus
civitatis） or national right。 2。 The state； again； viewed in
relation to other peoples； is called a power （potentia）； whence arises
the idea of potentates。 Viewed in relation to the supposed
hereditary unity of the people composing it； the state constitutes a
nation （gens）。 Under the general conception of public right； in
addition to the right of the individual state； there thus arises
another department of right； constituting the right of nations （jus
gentium） or international right。 3。 Further； as the surface of the
earth is not unlimited in extent； but is circumscribed into a unity；
national right and international right necessarily culminate in the
idea of a universal right of mankind； which may be called
Cosmopolitical Right （jus cosmopoliticum）。 And national；
international； and cosmopolitical right are so interconnected； that；
if any one of these three possible forms of the juridical relation
fails to embody the essential principles that ought to regulate
external freedom by law； the structure of legislation reared by the
others will also be undermined； and the whole system would at last
fall to pieces。
I。 Right of the State and Constitutional Law。
（Jus Civitatis）。
44。 Origin Of the Civil Union and Public Right。
It is not from any experience prior to the appearance of an external
authoritative legislation that we learn of the maxim of natural
violence among men and their evil tendency to engage in war with
each other。 Nor is it assumed here that it is merely some particular
historical condition or fact； that makes public legislative constraint
necessary； for however well…disposed or favourable to right men may be
considered to be of themselves； the rational idea of a state of
society not yet regulated by right； must be taken as our
starting…point。 This idea implies that before a legal state of society
can be publicly established； individual men； nations； and states；
can never be safe against violence from each other； and this is
evident from the consideration that every one of his own will
naturally does what seems good and right in his own eyes； entirely
independent of the opinion of others。 Hence； unless the institution of
right is to be renounced； the first thing incumbent on men is to
accept the principle that it is necessary to leave the state of
nature； in which every one follows his own inclinations； and to form a
union of all those who cannot avoid coming into reciprocal
communication； and thus subject themselves in common to the external
restraint of public compulsory laws。 Men thus enter into a civil
union； in which every one has it determined by law what shall be
recognized as his； and this is secured to him by a competent
external power distinct from his own individuality。 Such is the
primary obligation； on the part of all men； to enter into the
relations of a civil state of society。
The natural condition of mankind need not； on this ground； be
represented as a state of absolute injustice； as if there could have
been no other relation originally among men but what was merely
determined by force。 But this natural condition must be regarded； if
it ever existed； as a state of society that was void of regulation
by right （status justitiae vacuus）； so that if a matter of right
came to be in dispute （jus controversum）； no competent judge was found
to give an authorized legal decision upon it。 It is therefore
reasonable that any one should constrain another by force； to pass
from such a nonjuridical state of life and enter within the
jurisdiction of a civil state of society。 For； although on the basis
of the ideas of right held by individuals as such； external things may
be acquired by occupancy or contract； yet such acquisition is only
provisory so long as it has not yet obtained the sanction of a
public law。 Till this sanction is reached； the condition of possession
is not determined by any public distributive justice； nor is it
secured by any power exercising public right。
If men were not disposed to recognize any acquisition at all as
rightful… even in a provisional way… prior to entering into the
civil state； this state of society would itself be impossible。 For the
laws regarding the mine and thine in the state of nature； contain
formally the very same thing as they prescribe in the civil state；
when it is viewed merely according to rational conceptions： only
that in the forms of the civil state the conditions are laid down
under which the formal prescriptions of the state of nature attain
realization conformable to distributive justice。 Were there； then； not
even provisionally； an external meum and tuum in the state of
nature； neither would there be any juridical duties in relation to
them； and； consequently； there would be no obligation to pass out of
that state into another。
45。 The Form of the State and its Three Powers。
A state （civitas） is the union of a number of men under juridical
laws。 These laws； as such； are to be regarded as necessary a priori…
that is； as following of themselves from the conceptions of external
right generally… and not as merely established by statute。 The form of
the state is thus involved in the idea of the state； viewed as it
ought to be according to pure principles of right； and this ideal form
furnishes the normal criterion of every real union that constitutes
a commonwealth。
Every state contains in itself three powers； the universal united
will of the people being thus personified in a political triad。
These are the legislative power； the executive power； and the
judiciary power。 1。 The legislative power of the sovereignty in the
state is embodied in the person of the lawgiver； 2。 the executive
power is embodied in the person of the ruler who administers the
Law； and 3。 the judiciary power； embodied in the person of the
judge； is the function of assigning every one what is his own；
according to the law （potestas legislatoria； rectoria； et judiciaria）。
These three powers may be compared to the three propositions in a
practical syllogism： the major as the sumption laying down the
universal law of a will； the minor presenting the command applicable
to an action according to the law as the principle of the subsumption；
and the conclusion containing the sentence； or judgement of right；
in the particular case under consideration。
46。 The Legislative Power and the Members of the State。
The legislative power； viewed in its rational principle； can only
belong to the united will of the people。 For； as all right ought to
proceed from this power； it is necessary that its laws should be
unable to do wrong to any one whatever。 Now； if any one individual
determines anything in the state in contradistinction to another； it
is always possible that he may perpetrate a wrong on that other； but
this is never possible when all determine and decree what is to be Law
to themselves。 Volenti non fit injuria。 Hence it is only the united
and consenting will of all the people… in so far as each of them
determines the same thing about all； and all determine the same
thing about each