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executive or governor； for the governor； as administrator； should
stand under the authority of the law； and is bound by it under the
supreme control of the legislator。 The legislative authority may
therefore deprive the governor of his power； depose him； or reform his
administration； but not punish him。 This is the proper and only
meaning of the common saying in England； 〃The King… as the supreme
executive power… can do no wrong。〃 For any such application of
punishment would necessarily be an act of that very executive power to
which the supreme right to compel according to law pertains； and which
would itself be thus subjected to coercion； which is
self…contradictory。
3。 Further； neither the legislative power nor the executive power
ought to exercise the judicial function； but only appoint judges as
magistrates。 It is the people who ought to judge themselves； through
those of the citizens who are elected by free choice as their
representatives for this purpose； and even specially for every process
or cause。 For the judicial sentence is a special act of public
distributive justice performed by a judge or court as a constitutional
administrator of the law； to a subject as one of the people。 Such an
act is not invested inherently with the power to determine and
assign to any one what is his。 Every individual among the people being
merely passive in this relation to the supreme power； either the
executive or the legislative authority might do him wrong in their
determinations in cases of dispute regarding the property of
individuals。 It would not be the people themselves who thus
determined； or who pronounced the judgements of 〃guilty〃 or 〃not
guilty〃 regarding their fellow…citizens。 For it is to the
determination of this issue in a cause that the court has to apply the
law； and it is by means of the executive authority； that the judge
holds power to assign to every one his own。 Hence it is only the
people that properly can judge in a cause… although indirectly
representatives elected and deputed by themselves； as in a jury。 It
would even be beneath the dignity of the sovereign head of the state
to play the judge； for this would be to put himself into a position in
which it would be possible to do wrong； and thus to subject himself to
the demand for an appeal to a still higher power （a rege male
informato ad regem melius informandum）。
It is by the co…operation of these three powers… the legislative；
the executive； and the judicial… that the state realizes its autonomy。
This autonomy consists in its organizing； forming； and maintaining
itself in accordance with the laws of freedom。 In their union the
welfare of the state is realized。 Salus reipublicae suprema lex。* By
this is not to be understood merely the individual well…being and
happiness of the citizens of the state； for… as Rousseau asserts… this
end may perhaps be more agreeably and more desirably attained in the
state of nature； or even under a despotic government。 But the
welfare of the state； as its own highest good； signifies that
condition in which the greatest harmony is attained between its
constitution and the principles of right… a condition of the state
which reason by a categorical imperative makes it obligatory upon us
to strive after。
*＇〃The health of the state is the highest law。〃＇
Constitutional and Juridical Consequences arising from
the Nature of the Civil Union。
A。 Right of the Supreme Power； Treason； Dethronement；
Revolution； Reform。
The origin of the supreme power is practically inscrutable by the
people who are placed under its authority。 In other words； the subject
need not reason too curiously in regard to its origin in the practical
relation； as if the right of the obedience due to it were to be
doubted （jus controversum）。 For as the people； in order to be able
to abjudicate with a title of right regarding the supreme power in the
state； must be regarded as already united under one common legislative
will； it cannot judge otherwise than as the present supreme head of
the state （summus imperans） wills。 The question has been raised as
to whether an actual contract of subjection （pactum subjectionis
civilis） originally preceded the civil government as a fact； or
whether the power arose first； and the law only followed afterwards；
or may have followed in this order。 But such questions； as regards the
people already actually living under the civil law； are either
entirely aimless； or even fraught with subtle danger to the state。
For； should the subject； after having dug down to the ultimate
origin of the state； rise in opposition to the present ruling
authority； he would expose himself as a citizen； according to the
law and with full right； to be punished； destroyed； or outlawed。 A law
which is so holy and inviolable that it is practically a crime even to
cast doubt upon it； or to suspend its operation for a moment； is
represented of itself as necessarily derived from some supreme；
unblameable lawgiver。 And this is the meaning of the maxim； 〃All
authority is from God〃； which proposition does not express the
historical foundation of the civil constitution； but an ideal
principle of the practical reason。 It may be otherwise rendered
thus： 〃It is a duty to obey the law of the existing legislative power；
be its origin what it may。〃
Hence it follows； that the supreme power in the state has only
rights； and no （compulsory） duties towards the subject。 Further； if
the ruler or regent； as the organ of the supreme power； proceeds in
violation of the laws； as in imposing taxes； recruiting soldiers；
and so on； contrary to the law of equality in the distribution of
the political burdens； the subject may oppose complaints and
objections （gravamina） to this injustice； but not active resistance。
There cannot even be an Article contained in the political
constitution that would make it possible for a power in the state；
in case of the transgression of the constitutional laws by the supreme
authority； to resist or even to restrict it in so doing。 For；
whoever would restrict the supreme power of the state must have
more； or at least equal； power as compared with the power that is so
restricted； and if competent to command the subjects to resist； such a
one would also have to be able to protect them； and if he is to be
considered capable of judging what is right in every case； he may also
publicly order resistance。 But such a one； and not the actual
authority； would then be the supreme power； which is contradictory。
The supreme sovereign power； then； in proceeding by a minister who
is at the same time the ruler of the state； consequently becomes
despotic； and the expedient of giving the people to imagine… when they
have properly only legislative influence… that they act by their
deputies by way of limiting the sovereign authority； cannot so mask
and disguise the actual despotism of such a government that it will
not appear in the measures and means adopted by the minister to
carry out his function。 The people； while represented by their
deputies in parliament； under such conditions； may have in these
warrantors of their freedom and rights； persons who are keenly
interested on their own account and their families； and who look to
such a minister for the benefit of his influence in the army； navy；
and public offices。 And hence； instead of offering resistance to the
undue pretensions of the government… whose public declarations ought
to carry a prior accord on the part of the people； which； however；
cannot be allowed in peace； they are rather always ready to play
into the hands of the government。 Hence the so…called limited
political constitution； as a constitution of the internal rights of
the state； is an unreality； and instead of being consistent with
right； it is only a principle of expediency。 And its aim is not so
much to throw all possible obstacles in the way of a powerful violator
of popular rights by his arbitrary influence upon the government； as
rather to cloak it over under the illusion of a right of opposition
conceded to the people。
Resistance on the part of the people to the supreme legislative
power of the state is in no case legitimate； for it is only by
submission to the universal legislative will； that a condition of
law and order is possible。 Hence there is no right of sedition； and
still less of rebellion； belonging to the people。 And least of all；
when the supreme power is embodied in an individual monarch； is
there any justification； under the pretext of his abuse of power；
for seizing his person or taking away his life （monarchomachismus
sub specie tyrannicidii）。 The slightest attempt of this kind is high
treason （proditio eminens）； and a traitor of this sort who aims at the
overthrow of his country may be punished； as a political parricide；
even with death。 It is the duty of the