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Now a hereditary nobility is a rank which takes precedence of merit
and is hoped for without any good reason… a thing of the imagination
without genuine reality。 For if an ancestor had merit； he could not
transmit it to his posterity； but they must always acquire it for
themselves。 Nature has in fact not so arranged that the talent and
will which give rise to merit in the state； are hereditary。 And
because it cannot be supposed of any individual that he will throw
away his freedom； it is impossible that the common will of all the
people should agree to such a groundless prerogative； and hence the
sovereign cannot make it valid。 It may happen； however； that such an
anomaly as that of subjects who would be more than citizens； in the
manner of born officials； or hereditary professors； has slipped into
the mechanism of government in olden times； as in the case of the
feudal system； which was almost entirely organized with reference to
war。 Under such circumstances； the state cannot deal otherwise with
this error of a wrongly instituted rank in its midst； than by the
remedy of a gradual extinction through hereditary positions being left
unfilled as they fall vacant。 The state has therefore the right
provisorily to let a dignity in title continue； until the public
opinion matures on the subject。 And this will thus pass from the
threefold division into sovereign； nobles； and people； to the
twofold and only natural division into sovereign and people。
No individual in the state can indeed be entirely without dignity；
for he has at least that of being a citizen； except when he has lost
his civil status by a crime。 As a criminal he is still maintained in
life； but he is made the mere instrument of the will of another；
whether it be the state or a particular citizen。 In the latter
position； in which he could only be placed by a juridical judgement；
he would practically become a slave； and would belong as property
（dominium） to another； who would be not merely his master （herus）
but his owner （dominus）。 Such an owner would be entitled to exchange
or alienate him as a thing； to use him at will except for shameful
purposes； and to dispose of his powers； but not of his life and
members。 No one can bind himself to such a condition of dependence； as
he would thereby cease to be a person； and it is only as a person that
he can make a contract。 It may； however； appear that one man may
bind himself to another by a contract of hire； to discharge a
certain service that is permissible in its kind； but is left
entirely undetermined as regards its measure or amount； and that as
receiving wages or board or protection in return； he thus becomes only
a servant subject to the will of a master （subditus） and not a slave
（servus）。 But this is an illusion。 For if masters are entitled to
use the powers of such subjects at will； they may exhaust these
powers… as has been done in the case of Negroes in the Sugar Island…
and they may thus reduce their servants to despair and death。 But this
would imply that they had actually given themselves away to their
masters as property； which； in the case of persons； is impossible。 A
person can； therefore； only contract to perform work that is defined
both in quality and quantity； either as a day…labourer or as a
domiciled subject。 In the latter case he may enter into a contract
of lease for the use of the land of a superior； giving a definite rent
or annual return for its utilization by himself； or he may contract
for his service as a labourer upon the land。 But he does not thereby
make himself a slave； or a bondsman； or a serf attached to the soil
（glebae adscriptus）； as he would thus divest himself of his
personality； he can only enter into a temporary or at most a heritable
lease。 And even if by committing a crime he has personally become
subjected to another； this subject…condition does not become
hereditary； for he has only brought it upon himself by his own
wrongdoing。 Neither can one who has been begotten by a slave be
claimed as property on the ground of the cost of his rearing；
because such rearing is an absolute duty naturally incumbent upon
parents； and in case the parents be slaves； it devolves upon their
masters or owners； who； in undertaking the possession of such
subjects； have also made themselves responsible for the performance of
their duties。
E。 The Right of Punishing and of Pardoning。
I。 The Right of Punishing。
The right of administering punishment is the right of the
sovereign as the supreme power to inflict pain upon a subject on
account of a crime committed by him。 The head of the state cannot
therefore be punished； but his supremacy may be withdrawn from him。
Any transgression of the public law which makes him who commits it
incapable of being a citizen； constitutes a crime； either simply as
a private crime （crimen）； or also as a public crime （crimen publicum）。
Private crimes are dealt with by a civil court； public crimes by a
criminal court。 Embezzlement or speculation of money or goods
entrusted in trade； fraud in purchase or sale； if done before the eyes
of the party who suffers； are private crimes。 On the other hand；
coining false money or forging bills of exchange； theft； robbery；
etc。； are public crimes； because the commonwealth； and not merely some
particular individual； is endangered thereby。 Such crimes may be
divided into those of a base character （indolis abjectae） and those of
a violent character （indolis violentiae）。
Judicial or juridical punishment （poena forensis） is to be
distinguished from natural punishment （poena naturalis）； in which
crime as vice punishes itself； and does not as such come within the
cognizance of the legislator。 juridical punishment can never be
administered merely as a means for promoting another good either
with regard to the criminal himself or to civil society； but must in
all cases be imposed only because the individual on whom it is
inflicted has committed a crime。 For one man ought never to be dealt
with merely as a means subservient to the purpose of another； nor be
mixed up with the subjects of real right。 Against such treatment his
inborn personality has a right to protect him； even although he may be
condemned to lose his civil personality。 He must first be found guilty
and punishable； before there can be any thought of drawing from his
punishment any benefit for himself or his fellow…citizens。 The penal
law is a categorical imperative； and woe to him who creeps through the
serpent…windings of utilitarianism to discover some advantage that may
discharge him from the justice of punishment； or even from the due
measure of it； according to the Pharisaic maxim： 〃It is better that
one man should die than that the whole people should perish。〃 For if
justice and righteousness perish； human life would no longer have
any value in the world。 What； then； is to be said of such a proposal
as to keep a criminal alive who has been condemned to death； on his
being given to understand that； if he agreed to certain dangerous
experiments being performed upon him； he would be allowed to survive
if he came happily through them？ It is argued that physicians might
thus obtain new information that would be of value to the
commonweal。 But a court of justice would repudiate with scorn any
proposal of this kind if made to it by the medical faculty； for
justice would cease to be justice； if it were bartered away for any
consideration whatever。
But what is the mode and measure of punishment which public
justice takes as its principle and standard？ It is just the
principle of equality； by which the pointer of the scale of justice is
made to incline no more to the one side than the other。 It may be
rendered by saying that the undeserved evil which any one commits on
another is to be regarded as perpetrated on himself。 Hence it may be
said： 〃If you slander another； you slander yourself； if you steal from
another； you steal from yourself； if you strike another； you strike
yourself； if you kill another； you kill yourself。〃 This is the right
of retaliation （jus talionis）； and； properly understood； it is the
only principle which in regulating a public court； as distinguished
from mere private judgement； can definitely assign both the quality
and the quantity of a just penalty。 All other standards are wavering
and uncertain； and on account of other considerations involved in
them； they contain no principle conformable to the sentence of pure
and strict justice。 It may appear； however； that difference of
social status would not admit the application of the principle of
retaliation； which is that of 〃like with like。〃 But although the
application may not in all cases be possible according to the
letter； yet as regards the effect it may always be attained in
practice； by due regard being given to the disposition and sentiment
of the parties in the higher soci