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legislative power； and yet it would be made binding upon the people；
which； on the principle that 〃No one can serve two masters；〃 is a
contradiction。
II。 The Right of Nations and International Law。
（Jus Gentium）。
53。 Nature and Division of the Right of Nations。
The individuals； who make up a people； may be regarded as natives of
the country sprung by natural descent from a common ancestry
（congeniti）； although this may not hold entirely true in detail。
Again； they may be viewed according to the intellectual and
juridical relation； as born of a common political mother； the
republic； so that they constitute； as it were； a public family or
nation （gens； natio） whose members are all related to each other as
citizens of the state。 As members of a state； they do not mix with
those who live beside them in the state of nature； considering such to
be ignoble。 Yet these savages； on account of the lawless freedom
they have chosen； regard themselves as superior to civilized
peoples； and they constitute tribes and even races； but not states。
The public right of states （jus publicum civitatum）； in their
relations to one another； is what we have to consider under the
designation of the 〃right of nations。〃 Wherever a state； viewed as a
moral person； acts in relation to another existing in the condition of
natural freedom； and consequently in a state of continual war； such
right takes it rise。
The right of nations in relation to the state of war may be
divided into： 1。 the right of going to war； 2。 right during war； and
3。 right after war； the object of which is to constrain the nations
mutually to pass from this state of war and to found a common
constitution establishing perpetual peace。 The difference between
the right of individual men or families as related to each other in
the state of nature； and the right of the nations among themselves；
consists in this； that in the right of nations we have to consider not
merely a relation of one state to another as a whole； but also the
relation of the individual persons in one state to the individuals
of another state； as well as to that state as a whole。 This
difference； however； between the right of nations and the right of
individuals in the mere state of nature； requires to be determined
by elements which can easily be deduced from the conception of the
latter。
54。 Elements of the Right of Nations。
The elements of the right of nations are as follows：
1。 States； viewed as nations； in their external relations to one
another… like lawless savages… are naturally in a non…juridical
condition；
2。 This natural condition is a state of war in which the right of
the stronger prevails； and although it may not in fact be always found
as a state of actual war and incessant hostility； and although no real
wrong is done to any one therein； yet the condition is wrong in itself
in the highest degree； and the nations which form states contiguous to
each other are bound mutually to pass out of it；
3。 An alliance of nations； in accordance with the idea of an
original social contract； is necessary to protect each other against
external aggression and attack； but not involving interference with
their several internal difficulties and disputes；
4。 This mutual connection by alliance must dispense with a
distinct sovereign power； such as is set up in the civil constitution；
it can only take the form of a federation； which as such may be
revoked on any occasion； and must consequently be renewed from time to
time。
This is therefore a right which comes in as an accessory （in
subsidium） of another original right； in order to prevent the
nations from falling from right and lapsing into the state of actual
war with each other。 It thus issues in the idea of a foedus
amphictyonum。
55。 Right of Going to War as related to the
Subjects of the State。
We have then to consider； in the first place； the original right
of free states to go to war with each other as being still in a
state of nature； but as exercising this right in order to establish
some condition of society approaching the juridical And； first of all；
the question arises as to what right the state has in relation to
its own subjects； to use them in order to make war against other
states； to employ their property and even their lives for this
purpose； or at least to expose them to hazard and danger； and all this
in such a way that it does not depend upon their own personal
judgement whether they will march into the field of war or not； but
the supreme command of the sovereign claims to settle and dispose of
them thus。
This right appears capable of being easily established。 It may be
grounded upon the right which every one has to do with what is his own
as he will。 Whatever one has made substantially for himself； he
holds as his incontestable property。 The following； then； is such a
deduction as a mere jurist would put forward。
There are various natural products in a country which； as regards
the number and quantity in which they exist； must be considered as
specially produced （artefacta） by the work of the state； for the
country would not yield them to such extent were it not under the
constitution of the state and its regular administrative government；
or if the inhabitants were still living in the state of nature。 Sheep；
cattle； domestic fowl the most useful of their kind… swine； and such
like； would either be used up as necessary food or destroyed by beasts
of prey in the district in which I live； so that they would entirely
disappear； or be found in very scant supplies； were it not for the
government securing to the inhabitants their acquisitions and
property。 This holds likewise of the population itself； as we see in
the case of the American deserts； and even were the greatest
industry applied in those regions… which is not yet done… there
might be but a scanty population。 The inhabitants of any country would
be but sparsely sown here and there were it not for the protection
of government； because without it they could not spread themselves
with their households upon a territory which was always in danger of
being devastated by enemies or by wild beasts of prey； and further； so
great a multitude of men as now live in any one country could not
otherwise obtain sufficient means of support。 Hence； as it can be said
of vegetable growths； such as potatoes； as well as of domesticated
animals； that because the abundance in which they are found is a
product of human labour； they may be used； destroyed； and consumed
by man； so it seems that it may be said of the sovereign； as the
supreme power in the state； that he has the right to lead his
subjects； as being for the most part productions of his own； to war；
as if it were to the chase； and even to march them to the field of
battle； as if it were on a pleasure excursion。
This principle of right may be supposed to float dimly before the
mind of the monarch； and it certainly holds true at least of the lower
animals which may become the property of man。 But such a principle
will not at all apply to men； especially when viewed as citizens who
must be regarded as members of the state； with a share in the
legislation； and not merely as means for others but as ends in
themselves。 As such they must give their free consent； through their
representatives； not only to the carrying on of war generally； but
to every separate declaration of war； and it is only under this
limiting condition that the state has a right to demand their services
in undertakings so full of danger。
We would therefore deduce this right rather from the duty of the
sovereign to the people than conversely。 Under this relation； the
people must be regarded as having given their sanction； and； having
the right of voting； they may be considered； although thus passive
in reference to themselves individually； to be active in so far as
they represent the sovereignty itself。
56。 Right of Going to War in relation
to Hostile States。
Viewed as in the state of nature； the right of nations to go to
war and to carry on hostilities is the legitimate way by which they
prosecute their rights by their own power when they regard
themselves as injured； and this is done because in that state the
method of a juridical process； although the only one proper to
settle such disputes； cannot be adopted。
The threatening of war is to be distinguished from the active injury
of a first aggression； which again is distinguished from the general
outbreak of hostilities。 A threat or menace may be given by the active
preparation of armaments； upon which a right of prevention （jus
praeventionis） is founded on the other side； or merely by the
formidable increase of the power of another state （potestas
tremenda） by a