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do wrong in offering resistance； but such a one would really not be my
enemy。
61。 Perpetual Peace and a Permanent Congress of Nations。
The natural state of nations as well as of individual men is a state
which it is a duty to pass out of； in order to enter into a legal
state。 Hence； before this transition occurs； all the right of
nations and all the external property of states acquirable or
maintainable by war are merely provisory； and they can only become
peremptory in a universal union of states analogous to that by which a
nation becomes a state。 It is thus only that a real state of peace
could be established。 But with the too great extension of such a union
of states over vast regions； any government of it； and consequently
the protection of its individual members； must at last become
impossible； and thus a multitude of such corporations would again
bring round a state of war。 Hence the perpetual peace； which is the
ultimate end of all the right of nations； becomes in fact an
impracticable idea。 The political principles； however； which aim at
such an end； and which enjoin the formation of such unions among the
states as may promote a continuous approximation to a perpetual peace；
are not impracticable； they are as practicable as this approximation
itself； which is a practical problem involving a duty； and founded
upon the right of individual men and states。
Such a union of states； in order to maintain peace； may be called
a permanent congress of nations； and it is free to every
neighbouring state to join in it。 A union of this kind； so far at
least as regards the formalities of the right of nations in respect of
the preservation of peace； was presented in the first half of this
century； in the Assembly of the States…General at the Hague。 In this
Assembly most of the European courts； and even the smallest republics；
brought forward their complaints about the hostilities which were
carried on by the one against the other。 Thus the whole of Europe
appeared like a single federated state； accepted as umpire by the
several nations in their public differences。 But in place of this
agreement； the right of nations afterwards survived only in books；
it disappeared from the cabinets； or； after force had been already
used； it was relegated in the form of theoretical deductions to the
obscurity of archives。
By such a congress is here meant only a voluntary combination of
different states that would be dissoluble at any time； and not such
a union as is embodied in the United States of America； founded upon a
political constitution； and therefore indissoluble。 It is only by a
congress of this kind that the idea of a public right of nations can
be established； and that the settlement of their differences by the
mode of a civil process； and not by the barbarous means of war； can be
realized。
III。 The Universal Right of Mankind。
（Jus Cosmopoliticum）
62。 Nature and Conditions of Cosmopolitical Right。
The rational idea of a universal； peaceful； if not yet friendly；
union of all the nations upon the earth that may come into active
relations with each other； is a juridical principle； as
distinguished from philanthropic or ethical principles。 Nature has
enclosed them altogether within definite boundaries； in virtue of
the spherical form of their abode as a globus terraqueus； and the
possession of the soil upon which an inhabitant of the earth may
live can only be regarded as possession of a part of a limited whole
and； consequently； as a part to which every one has originally a
right。 Hence all nations originally hold a community of the soil；
but not a juridical community of possession （communio）； nor
consequently of the use or proprietorship of the soil； but only of a
possible physical intercourse （commercium） by means of it。 In other
words； they are placed in such thoroughgoing relations of each to
all the rest that they may claim to enter into intercourse with one
another； and they have a right to make an attempt in this direction；
while a foreign nation would not be entitled to treat them on this
account as enemies。 This right； in so far as it relates to a
possible union of all nations； in respect of certain laws
universally regulating their intercourse with each other； may be
called 〃cosmopolitical right〃 （jus cosmopoliticum）。
It may appear that seas put nations out of all communion with each
other。 But this is not so； for by means of commerce； seas form the
happiest natural provision for their intercourse。 And the more there
are of neighbouring coastlands； as in the case of the Mediterranean
Sea； this intercourse becomes the more animated。 And hence
communications with such lands； especially where there are settlements
upon them connected with the mother countries giving occasion for such
communications； bring it about that evil and violence committed in one
place of our globe are felt in all。 Such possible abuse cannot；
however； annul the right of man as a citizen of the world to attempt
to enter into communion with all others； and for this purpose to visit
all the regions of the earth； although this does not constitute a
right of settlement upon the territory of another people （jus
incolatus）； for which a special contract is required。
But the question is raised as to whether； in the case of newly
discovered countries； a people may claim the right to settle
（accolatus）； and to occupy possessions in the neighbourhood of another
people that has already settled in that region； and to do this without
their consent。
Such a right is indubitable； if the new settlement takes place at
such a distance from the seat of the former that neither would
restrict or injure the other in the use of their territory。 But in the
case of nomadic peoples； or tribes of shepherds and hunters （such as
the Hottentots； the Tungusi； and most of the American Indians）；
whose support is derived from wide desert tracts； such occupation
should never take place by force； but only by contract； and any such
contract ought never to take advantage of the ignorance of the
original dwellers in regard to the cession of their lands。 Yet it is
commonly alleged that such acts of violent appropriation may be
justified as subserving the general good of the world。 It appears as
if sufficiently justifying grounds were furnished for them； partly
by reference to the civilization of barbarous peoples （as by a pretext
of this kind even Busching tries to excuse the bloody introduction
of the Christian religion into Germany）； and partly by founding upon
the necessity of purging one's own country from depraved criminals；
and the hope of their improvement or that of their posterity； in
another continent like New Holland。 But all these alleged good
purposes cannot wash out the stain of injustice in the means
employed to attain them。 It may be objected that； had such
scrupulousness about making a beginning in founding a legal state with
force been always maintained； the whole earth would still have been in
a state of lawlessness。 But such an objection would as little annul
the conditions of right in question as the pretext of the political
revolutionaries that； when a constitution has become degenerate； it
belongs to the people to transform it by force。 This would amount
generally to being unjust once and for all； in order thereafter to
found justice the more surely； and to make it flourish。
CONCLUSION
Conclusion。
If one cannot prove that a thing is； he may try to prove that it
is not。 And if he succeeds in doing neither （as often occurs）； he
may still ask whether it is in his interest to accept one or other
of the alternatives hypothetically； from the theoretical or the
practical point of view。 In other words； a hypothesis may be
accepted either in order to explain a certain phenomenon （as in
astronomy to account for the retrogression and stationariness of the
planets）； or in order to attain a certain end； which again may be
either pragmatic； as belonging merely to the sphere of art； or
moral； as involving a purpose which it is a duty to adopt as a maxim
of action。 Now it is evident that the assumption （suppositio） of the
practicability of such an end； though presented merely as a
theoretical and problematical judgement； may be regarded as
constituting a duty； and hence it is so regarded in this case。 For
although there may be no positive obligation to believe in such an
end； yet even if there were not the least theoretical probability of
action being carried out in accordance with it； so long as its
impossibility cannot be demonstrated； there still remains a duty
incumbent upon us with regard to it。
Now； as a matter of fact； the morally practical reason utters within
us its irrevocable veto： There shall be no war。 So there ought to be
no war； neither between me and you in the condition of na