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physical。 The possibility of such a possession； thus conceived；
cannot； however； be proved or comprehended in itself； because it is
a rational conception for which no empirical perception can be
furnished； but it follows as an immediate consequence from the
postulate that has been enunciated。 For； if it is necessary to act
according to that juridical principle； the rational or intelligible
condition of a purely juridical possession must also be possible。 It
need astonish no one； then； that the theoretical aspect of the
principles of the external mine and thine is lost from view in the
rational sphere of pure intelligence and presents no extension of
knowledge； for the conception of freedom upon which they rest does not
admit of any theoretical deduction of its possibility； and it can only
be inferred from the practical law of reason； called the categorical
imperative； viewed as a fact。
7。 Application of the Principle of the Possibility of
an External Mine and Thine to Objects of Experience。
The conception of a purely juridical possession is not an
empirical conception dependent on conditions of space and time； and
yet it has practical reality。 As such it must be applicable to objects
of experience； the knowledge of which is independent of the conditions
of space and time。 The rational process by which the conception of
right is brought into relation to such objects so as to constitute a
possible external mine and thine； is as follows。 The conception of
right； being contained merely in reason； cannot be immediately applied
to objects of experience； so as to give the conception of an empirical
possession； but must be applied directly to the mediating
conception； in the understanding； of possession in general； so that；
instead of physical holding （detentio） as an empirical
representation of possession； the formal conception or thought of
having； abstracted from all conditions of space and time； is conceived
by the mind； and only as implying that an object is in my power and at
my disposal （in potestate mea positum esse）。 In this relation； the
term external does not signify existence in another place than where I
am； nor my resolution and acceptance at another time than the moment
in which I have the offer of a thing： it signifies only an object
different from or other than myself。 Now the practical reason by its
law of right wills； that I shall think the mine and thine in
application to objects； not according to sensible conditions； but
apart from these and from the possession they indicate； because they
refer to determinations of the activity of the will that are in
accordance with the laws of freedom。 For it is only a conception of
the understanding that can be brought under the rational conception of
right。 I may therefore say that I possess a field； although it is in
quite a different place from that on which I actually find myself。 For
the question here is not concerning an intellectual relation to the
object； but I have the thing practically in my power and at my
disposal； which is a conception of possession realized by the
understanding and independent of relations of space； and it is mine；
because my will； in determining itself to any particular use of it； is
not in conflict with the law of external freedom。 Now it is just in
abstraction from physical possession of the object of my free…will
in the sphere of sense； that the practical reason wills that a
rational possession of it shall be thought； according to
intellectual conceptions which are not empirical； but contain a priori
the conditions of rational possession。 Hence it is in this fact；
that we found the ground of the validity of such a rational conception
of possession possessio noumenon） as a principle of a universally
valid legislation。 For such a legislation is implied and contained
in the expression； 〃This external object is mine；〃 because an
obligation is thereby imposed upon all others in respect of it； who
would otherwise not have been obliged to abstain from the use of
this object。
The mode； then； of having something external to myself as mine；
consists in a specially juridical connection of the will of the
subject with that object； independently of the empirical relations
to it in space and in time； and in accordance with the conception of a
rational possession。 A particular spot on the earth is not
externally mine because I occupy it with my body； for the question
here discussed refers only to my external freedom； and consequently it
affects only the possession of myself； which is not a thing external
to me； and therefore only involves an internal right。 But if I
continue to be in possession of the spot； although I have taken myself
away from it and gone to another place； only under that condition is
my external right concerned in connection with it。 And to make the
continuous possession of this spot by my person a condition of
having it as mine； must either be to assert that it is not possible at
all to have anything external as one's own； which is contrary to the
postulate in SS 2； or to require； in order that this external
possession may be possible； that I shall be in two places at the
same time。 But this amounts to saying that I must be in a place and
also not in it； which is contradictory and absurd。
This position may be applied to the case in which I have accepted
a promise； for my having and possession in respect of what has been
promised become established on the ground of external right。 This
right is not to be annulled by the fact that the promiser having
said at one time； 〃This thing shall be yours；〃 again at a subsequent
time says； 〃My will now is that the thing shall not be yours。〃 In such
relations of rational right； the conditions hold just the same as if
the promiser had； without any interval of time between them； made
the two declarations of his will； 〃This shall be yours；〃 and also
〃This shall not be yours〃； which manifestly contradicts itself。
The same thing holds； in like manner； of the conception of the
juridical possession of a person as belonging to the Having of a
subject； whether it be a wife； a child； or a servant。 The relations of
right involved in a household； and the reciprocal possession of all
its members； are not annulled by the capability of separating from
each other in space； because it is by juridical relations that they
are connected； and the external mine and thine； as in the former
cases； rests entirely upon the assumption of the possibility of a
purely rational possession； without the accompaniment of physical
detention or holding of the object。
Reason is forced to a critique of its juridically practical function
in special reference to the conception of the external mine and thine；
by the antinomy of the propositions enunciated regarding the
possibility of such a form of possession。 For these give rise to an
inevitable dialectic； in which a thesis and an antithesis set up equal
claims to the validity of two conflicting conditions。 Reason is thus
compelled； in its practical function in relation to right… as it was
in its theoretical function… to make a distinction between
possession as a phenomenal appearance presented to the senses； and
that possession which is rational and thinkable only by the
understanding。
Thesis。… The thesis； in this case； is： 〃It is possible to have
something external as mine； although I am not in possession of it。〃
Antithesis。… The antithesis is： 〃It is not possible to have anything
external as mine； if I am not in possession of it。〃
Solution。… The solution is： 〃Both Propositions are true〃； the former
when I mean empirical possession （possessio phaenomenon）； the latter
when I understand by the same term； a purely rational possession
（possessio noumenon）。
But the possibility of a rational possession； and consequently of an
external mine and thine； cannot be comprehended by direct insight； but
must be deduced from the practical reason。 And in this relation it
is specially noteworthy that the practical reason without
intuitional perceptions； and even without requiring such an element
a priori； can extend its range by the mere elimination of empirical
conditions； as justified by the law of freedom； and can thus establish
synthetical propositions a priori。 The proof of this in the
practical connection； as will be shown afterwards； can be adduced in
an analytical manner。
8。 To Have Anything External as One's Own is only Possible
in a Juridical or Civil State of Society under the
Regulation of a Public Legislative Power。
If； by word or deed； I declare my will that some external thing
shall be mine； I make a declaration that every other person is obliged
to abstain from the use of this object of my exercise of will； and
this imposes an obligation which no one would be under； without such a
juridical act on my part。 But the assumption