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juridical possession （possessio noumenon）。 It is founded upon the fact
that； as all these acts are juridical； they consequently proceed
from the practical reason； and therefore； in the question as to what
is right； abstraction may be made of the empirical conditions
involved； and the conclusion； 〃the external object is mine；〃 thus
becomes a correct inference from the external fact of sensible
possession to the internal right of rational possession。
The original primary acquisition of an external object of the action
of the will； is called occupancy。 It can only take place in
reference to substances or corporeal things。 Now when this
occupation of an external object does take place； the act presupposes；
as a condition of such empirical possession； its priority in time
before the act of any other who may also be willing to enter upon
occupation of it。 Hence the legal maxim： 〃qui prior tempore； potior
jure。〃 Such occupation as original or primary is； further； the
effect only of a single or unilateral will； for were a bilateral or
twofold will requisite for it； it would be derived from a contract
of two or more persons with each other； and consequently it would be
based upon what another or others had already made their own。 It is
not easy to see how such an act of free…will as this would be could
really form a foundation for every one having his own。 However； the
first acquisition of a thing is on that account not quite exactly
the same as the original acquisition of it。 For the acquisition of a
public juridical state by union of the wills of all in a universal
legislation would be such an original acquisition； seeing that no
other of the kind could precede it； and yet it would be derived from
the particular wills of all the individuals； and consequently become
all…sided or omnilateral； for a properly primary acquisition can
only proceed from an individual or unilateral or unilateral will。
DIVISION OF THE SUBJECT OF THE ACQUISITION OF THE EXTERNAL
MINE AND THINE。
I。 In respect of the matter of object of acquisition； I acquire
either a corporeal thing （substance）； or the performance of
something by another （causality）； or this other as a person in respect
of his state； so far as I have a right to dispose of the same （in a
relation of reciprocity with him）。
II。 In respect of the form or mode of acquisition； it is either a
real right （jus reale）； or a personal right （jus personale）； or a
real…personal right （jus realiter personale）； to the possession
although not to the use； of another person as if he were a thing。
III。 In respect of the ground of right or the title （titulus） of
acquisition… which； properly； is not a particular member of the
division of rights； but rather a constituent element of the mode of
exercising them… anything external is acquired by a certain free
exercise of will that is either unilateral； as the act of a single
will （facto）； or bilateral； as the act of two wills （pacto）； or
omnilateral； as the act of all the wills of a community together
（lege）。
SECTION I。 Principles of Real Right。
11。 What is a Real Right？
The usual definition of real right； or 〃right in a thing〃 （jus
reale； jus in re）； is that 〃it is a right as against every possessor
of it。〃 This is a correct nominal definition。 But what is it that
entitles me to claim an external object from any one who may appear as
its possessor； and to compel him； per vindicationem； to put me
again； in place of himself； into possession of it？ Is this external
juridical relation of my will a kind of immediate relation to an
external thing？ If so； whoever might think of his right as referring
not immediately to persons but to things would have to represent it；
although only in an obscure way； somewhat thus。 A right on one side
has always a duty corresponding to it on the other； so that an
external thing； although away from the hands of its first possessor；
continues to be still connected with him by a continuing obligation；
and thus it refuses to fall under the claim of any other possessor；
because it is already bound to another。 In this way my right； viewed
as a kind of good genius accompanying a thing and preserving it from
all external attack； would refer an alien possessor always to me！ It
is； however； absurd to think of an obligation of persons towards
things； and conversely； although it may be allowed in any particular
case to represent the juridical relation by a sensible image of this
kind； and to express it in this way。
The real definition would run thus： 〃Right in a thing is a right
to the private use of a thing； of which I am in possession… original
or derivative… in common with all others。〃 For this is the one
condition under which it is alone possible that I can exclude every
others possessor from the private use of the thing （jus contra
quemlibet hujus rei possessorem）。 For； except by presupposing such a
common collective possession； it cannot be conceived how； when I am
not in actual possession of a thing； I could be injured or wronged
by others who are in possession of it and use it。 By an individual act
of my own will I cannot oblige any other person to abstain from the
use of a thing in respect of which he would otherwise be under no
obligation； and； accordingly； such an obligation can only arise from
the collective will of all united in a relation of common
possession。 Otherwise； I would have to think of a right in a thing； as
if the thing has an obligation towards me； and as if the right as
against every possessor of it had to be derived from this obligation
in the thing； which is an absurd way of representing the subject。
Further； by the term real right （jus reale） is meant not only the
right in a thing （jus in re）； but also the constitutive principle of
all the laws which relate to the real mine and thine。 It is；
however； evident that a man entirely alone upon the earth could
properly neither have nor acquire any external thing as his own；
because； between him as a person and all external things as material
objects； there could be no relations of obligation。 There is
therefore； literally； no direct right in a thing； but only that
right is to be properly called 〃real〃 which belongs to any one as
constituted against a person； who is in common possession of things
with all others in the civil state of society。
12。 The First Acquisition of a Thing can only
be that of the Soil。
By the soil is understood all habitable Land。 In relation to
everything that is moveable upon it； it is to be regarded as a
substance； and the mode of the existence of the moveables is viewed as
an inherence in it。 And just as； in the theoretical acceptance；
accidents cannot exist apart from their substances； so； in the
practical relation； moveables upon the soil cannot be regarded as
belonging to any one unless he is supposed to have been previously
in juridical possession of the soil； so that it is thus considered
to be his。
For； let it be supposed that the soil belongs to no one。 Then I
would be entitled to remove every moveable thing found upon it from
its place； even to total loss of it； in order to occupy that place；
without infringing thereby on the freedom of any other； there being；
by the hypothesis； no possessor of it at all。 But everything that
can be destroyed； such as a tree； a house； and such like… as regards
its matter at least… is moveable； and if we call a thing which
cannot be moved without destruction of its form an immoveable； the
mine and thine in it is not understood as applying to its substance；
but to that which is adherent to it and which does not essentially
constitute the thing itself。
13。 Every Part of the Soil may be Originally Acquired； and
the Principle of the Possibility of such Acquisition
is the Original Community of the Soil Generally。
The first clause of this proposition is founded upon the postulate
of the practical reason （SS 2）； the second is established by the
following proof。
All men are originally and before any juridical act of will in
rightful possession of the soil； that is； they have a right to be
wherever nature or chance has placed them without their will。
Possession （possessio）； which is to be distinguished from
residential settlement （sedes） as a voluntary； acquired； and permanent
possession； becomes common possession； on account of the connection
with each other of all the places on the surface of the earth as a
globe。 For； had the surface of the earth been an infinite plain； men
could have been so dispersed upon it that they might not have come
into any necessary communion with each other； and a state of social
community would not have been a necessary consequence of their
existence upon the earth。 Now that possession proper to all men upon
the earth； which is prior