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existence upon the earth。 Now that possession proper to all men upon
the earth； which is prior to all their particular juridical acts；
constitutes an original possession in common （communio possessionis
originaria）。 The conception of such an original； common possession
of things is not derived from experience； nor is it dependent on
conditions of time； as is the case with the imaginary and
indemonstrable fiction of a primaeval community of possession in
actual history。 Hence it is a practical conception of reason；
involving in itself the only principle according to which men may
use the place they happen to occupy on the surface of the earth； in
accordance with laws of right。
14。 The Juridical Act of this Original
Acquisition is Occupancy。
The act of taking possession （apprehensio）； being at its beginning
the physical appropriation of a corporeal thing in space （possessionis
physicae）； can accord with the law of the external freedom of all；
under no other condition than that of its priority in respect of time。
In this relation it must have the characteristic of a first act in the
way of taking possession； as a free exercise of will。 The activity
of will； however； as determining that the thing… in this case a
definite separate place on the surface of the earth… shall be mine；
being an act of appropriation； cannot be otherwise in the case of
original acquisition than individual or unilateral （voluntas
unilateralis s。 propria）。 Now； occupancy is the acquisition of an
external object by an individual act of will。 The original acquisition
of such an object as a limited portion of the soil can therefore
only be accomplished by an act of occupation。
The possibility of this mode of acquisition cannot be intuitively
apprehended by pure reason in any way； nor established by its
principles； but is an immediate consequence from the postulate of
the practical reason。 The will as practical reason； however； cannot
justify external acquisition otherwise than only in so far as it is
itself included in an absolutely authoritative will； with which it
is united by implication； or； in other words； only in so far as it
is contained within a union of the wills of all who come into
practical relation with each other。 For an individual； unilateral
will… and the same applies to a dual or other particular will…
cannot impose on all an obligation which is contingent in itself。 This
requires an omnilateral or universal will； which is not contingent；
but a priori； and which is therefore necessarily united and
legislative。 Only in accordance with such a principle can there be
agreement of the active free…will of each individual with the
freedom of all； and consequently rights in general； or even the
possibility of an external mine and thine。
15。 It is Only within a Civil Constitution that Anything can
be Acquired Peremptorily； whereas in the State of Nature
Acquisition can only be Provisory。
A civil constitution is objectively necessary as a duty； although
subjectively its reality is contingent。 Hence； there is connected with
it a real natural law of right； to which all external acquisition is
subjected。
The empirical title of acquisition has been shown to be
constituted by the taking physical possession （apprehensio physica） as
founded upon an original community of right in all to the soil。 And
because a possession in the phenomenal sphere of sense can only be
subordinated to that possession which is in accordance with rational
conceptions of right； there must correspond to this physical act of
possession a rational mode of taking possession by elimination of
all the empirical conditions in space and time。 This rational form
of possession establishes the proposition that 〃whatever I bring under
my power in accordance with laws of external freedom； and will that it
shall be mine； becomes mine。〃
The rational title of acquisition can therefore only lie
originally in the idea of the will of all united implicitly； or
necessarily to be united； which is here tacitly assumed as an
indispensable condition （conditio sine qua non）。 For by a single
will there cannot be imposed upon others an obligation by which they
would not have been otherwise bound。 But the fact formed by wills
actually and universally united in a legislation constitutes the civil
state of society。 Hence； it is only in conformity with the idea of a
civil state of society； or in reference to it and its realization；
that anything external can be acquired。 Before such a state is
realized； and in anticipation of it； acquisition； which would
otherwise be derived； is consequently only provisory。 The
acquisition which is peremptory finds place only in the civil state。
Nevertheless； such provisory acquisition is real acquisition。 For；
according to the postulate of the juridically practical reason； the
possibility of acquisition in whatever state men may happen to be
living beside one another； and therefore in the state of nature as
well； is a principle of private right。 And in accordance with this
principle； every one is justified or entitled to exercise that
compulsion by which it alone becomes possible to pass out of the state
of nature and to enter into that state of civil society which alone
can make all acquisition peremptory。
It is a question as to how far the right of taking possession of the
soil extends。 The answer is； So far as the capability of having it
under one's power extends； that is； just as far as he who wills to
appropriate it can defend it； as if the soil were to say： 〃If you
cannot protect me； neither can you command me。〃 In this way the
controversy about what constitutes a free or closed sea must be
decided。 Thus； within the range of a cannon…shot no one has a right to
intrude on the coast of a country that already belongs to a certain
state； in order to fish or gather amber on the shore； or such like。
Further； the question is put； 〃Is cultivation of the soil； by
building； agriculture； drainage； etc。； necessary in order to its
acquisition？〃 No。 For； as these processes as forms of specification
are only accidents； they do not constitute objects of immediate
possession and can only belong to the subject in so far as the
substance of them has been already recognized as his。 When it is a
question of the first acquisition of a thing； the cultivation or
modification of it by labour forms nothing more than an external
sign of the fact that it has been taken into possession； and this
can be indicated by many other signs that cost less trouble。 Again：
〃May any one be hindered in the act of taking possession； so that
neither one nor other of two competitors shall acquire the right of
priority； and the soil in consequence may remain for all time free
as belonging to no one？〃 Not at all。 Such a hindrance cannot be
allowed to take place； because the second of the two； in order to be
enabled to do this； would himself have to be upon some neighbouring
soil； where he also； in this manner； could be hindered from being； and
such absolute hindering would involve a contradiction。 It would；
however； be quite consistent with the right of occupation； in the case
of a certain intervening piece of the soil； to let it lie unused as
a neutral ground for the separation of two neighbouring states； but
under such a condition； that ground would actually belong to them both
in common； and would not be without an owner （res nullius）； just
because it would be used by both in order to form a separation between
them。 Again： 〃May one have a thing as his； on a soil of which no one
has appropriated any part as his own？〃 Yes。 In Mongolia； for
example； any one may let lie whatever baggage he has； or bring back
the horse that has run away from him into his possession as his own；
because the whole soil belongs to the people generally； and the use of
it accordingly belongs to every individual。 But that any one can
have a moveable thing on the soil of another as his own is only
possible by contract。 Finally； there is the question： 〃May one of
two neighbouring nations or tribes resist another when attempting to
impose upon them a certain mode of using a particular soil； as； for
instance； a tribe of hunters making such an attempt in relation to a
pastoral people； or the latter to agriculturists and such like？〃
Certainly。 For the mode in which such peoples or tribes may settle
themselves upon the surface of the earth； provided they keep within
their own boundaries； is a matter of mere pleasure and choice on their
own part （res merae facultatis）。
As a further question； it may be asked whether； when neither
nature nor chance； but merely our own will； brings us into the
neighbourhood of a people that gives no promise of a prospect of
entering into civil union with us； we are to be considered entitled in
any case to proceed with force in the inten